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U.S. Micromobility Law (Major Road Work Ahead)*
Peter W. Martin†
Over the past decade electrically powered bicycles, stand-up scooters, skateboards,
and more have burst onto the nation’s streets and sidewalks. This blossoming of
“micromobility” has taken place within physical and legal infrastructures illprepared for the change. Indisputably, most of the new types of individual motorized
mobility fell outside established vehicle categories. The literal terms of existing law
banned their use on all public rights of way, whether roadway, bicycle path, or
sidewalk.
This paper surveys the ad hoc, largely industry-driven, and still-distressinglyincomplete adjustment of U.S. vehicle and traffic laws to accommodate and regulate
the rapid spread of electrically-powered personal mobility devices. It also identifies
some of the social costs of lawmakers’ ignoring the phenomenon.

I. Introduction
The invention and development of the lithium-ion battery not only enabled a radical
redefinition of the phone and an explosion of portable electronic devices, it fueled
enormous innovation in the field of personal transportation. Most conspicuously it
led to a new generation of electrically-powered automobiles, hybrid and plug-in.
But it also made possible a diversity of smaller electric vehicles, some completely
novel, others of types previously propelled solely by human energy and gravity.
Over the past decade electrically powered bicycles, stand-up scooters, skateboards,
and more have found a ready market and eager riders. Not all those riders have
needed to be owners. Embedded technology combined with widespread smartphone
ownership enabled well-funded start-ups to distribute large numbers of these novel
electric vehicles across urban spaces, offering them for on-demand, short-term
rental.
© Peter W. Martin, 2022. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 License. To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/.
† Jane M.G. Foster Professor of Law, Emeritus, and cofounder, Legal Information Institute, Cornell
Law School, Ithaca, New York
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All of this has taken place within physical and legal infrastructures ill-prepared for
such change. The country’s public thoroughfares and traffic laws entered the
current era shaped around transportation flows consisting principally of: (1)
automobiles and their relatives (smaller and larger), (2) bicycles, and (3)
pedestrians. For each of those categories, the respective regulatory roles and rules
of federal, state, and local governments were reasonably settled. Indisputably, the
new types of individual motorized mobility did not fit. And since they did not fit,
the literal terms of existing law banned their use on all public rights of way,
whether roadway, bicycle path, or sidewalk. 1
This paper surveys the ad hoc, largely industry-driven, and still-distressinglyincomplete adjustment of U.S. vehicle and traffic laws to accommodate and regulate
the rapid spread of electrically-powered personal mobility devices. To appropriate a
term used by transportation planners and administrators, it offers an introduction
to the evolving field of U.S. “micromobility” law. The paper begins with a sketch of
the turn-of-the-century law regulating vehicles and vehicular movement on public
ways. The following section traces the legal adjustments that have since made
Segways, then electric bicycles, followed by electric stand-up scooters "street legal"
in a majority of states; and autonomous delivery devices, in a growing number.
Section IV considers some of the consequences for individual riders and the public,
generally, of legislative or administrative failures to address the full range of
mobility devices now in use. Section V explores the challenge of securing a
reasonable level of compliance with any new regulations governing micromobility.
Finally, the paper concludes with a few observations about the importance of
developing a more comprehensive, less ad hoc, approach to the regulation of
individual, electrically powered, low-speed vehicles and achieving broad adherence
to the resulting rules of the road.

Except as otherwise indicated the terms designating the different types and segments of public
rights-of-way are employed throughout the paper as they are defined and used quite consistently in
state and federal legislation. Importantly, the words “road,” “street,” and “highway” are used
interchangeably. The term “roadway” is used to refer to the portion of a road, street, or highway that
is designed for use by vehicles, “bicycle lane,” to refer to the portion designated for the primary or
exclusive use of bicycles (and now in some places, micromobility devices), and “sidewalk” to refer to
the portion of a road set aside for use by pedestrians. “Bicycle path” or “bikeway” indicates a public
right-of-way that is separate from a road, street, or highway. See infra p. 14.
1
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II. The Pre-Existing Legal Infrastructure: U.S. Vehicle and Traffic Law (circa 2000)
A. The Layers
As individuals move about on the country’s shared public ways (its roadways,
bikeways, sidewalks, pedestrian plazas, and paths) they, their actions, and any
vehicles involved are addressed by multiple layers of law. That holds whether they
are traveling by foot, wheelchair, auto, bicycle, horse, sled, or electrically powered
skateboard.
The thickest of those layers is a composite of the statutes, ordinances, court
decisions, and regulations of the state and local governments with jurisdiction over
the space where the movement takes place. Since the earliest days of motorized
vehicles, regulation of their use has been understood to be, predominantly, a state
and local matter. Federal regulation of vehicles and their movement expanded over
the twentieth century, but its scope remained more focused on vehicle design and
manufacture than use – except, of course, in national parks, military bases, and
other federal enclaves. 2 Under existing legislation, agencies of the federal
government have ample authority to insert themselves at the point of import, sale,
or further distribution of the recent wave of powered mobility devices. To date they
have exhibited little inclination to do so.
Consequently, as innovative modes of electrically powered, individual locomotion
emerged during the twenty-first century, the states have been forced into the role of
first responders. They have had to decide which types to allow on public ways, what
safety features to require of them, and, if allowed, exactly where and how those
types might be ridden, plus other terms and conditions of use. Thrust upon state
legislatures have been such questions as: whether a new type of powered vehicle
may be ridden (and parked) on public roadways, bicycle paths, or sidewalks, how it
should be maneuvered in proximity to other forms of vehicular and pedestrian
travel, how fast it ought to be driven, what age and other qualifications to require of
operators, and, not least, the initial legal response and ultimate consequences in the
event of a collision. Most states have passed significant regulatory authority on
some of these matters along to local units of government. Almost universally
addressed at the municipal level is whether to permit commercial firms to
distribute vehicles of any sort along public ways for short-term, on-demand rental
For an example of the exception, see the recent regulation governing the use of electric bicycles in
National Parks, 36 C.F.R.§4.30(i).
2
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and on what terms. Finally, the ultimate responsibility for enforcement of such
laws as exist on any of these topics lies at the state and local level.
B. Federal Law – Focused Principally on Equipment Standards and Accessibility
1. Vehicle and Traffic Law Initially Left to the States
The impact of state-by-state motor vehicle regulation on interstate commerce could
easily have supported any number of federal statutory measures, even during the
earliest days of the automobile. Law enforcement concern over the interstate
transportation of stolen vehicles stimulated a national response in 1919. 3 Later
federal enactments targeted the operation of “chop shops” – operations that
facilitate the disposition of stolen cars 4 – and the intentional destruction of vehicles
employed in interstate commerce. 5 Yet on such fundamental questions as whether
an automobile driven from one state into another must be registered at once in the
second or the degree to which a driver’s license issued by one state will allow the
holder to drive in another, the states themselves have shaped nearly all the rules,
first individually, and then through interstate compacts and other forms of
coordinated action. 6
Under the Interstate Compacts for Highway Safety Resolution of 1958, 7 Congress
gave states blanket permission to form compacts in the area of traffic safety. By the
resolution’s terms, traffic safety compacts do not, like those on other topics, require
submission to Congress for individual approval. Since 1958 two have obtained
widespread, although not universal, adherence. 8 Nearly all states plus the District

3 Act of Congress of October 29, 1919, ch 89, 41 Stat 324 (codified in its current form at 18 U.S.C. §
2312).
4 See 18 U.S.C. § 2322.
5 See 18 U.S.C. § 33.
6 At the international level, issues like these led to a series of twentieth century conventions and
treaties. The 1949 Convention on Road Traffic, to which the U.S. is a party, allows licensed U.S.
drivers to drive in other countries that adhere to it or the subsequent 1968 Vienna Convention and
grants reciprocal rights within the U.S. to holders of International Drivers Permits. The Convention
on the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic (1943) (to which the U.S., Mexico and other
countries to the south are parties) does the same. See Mich. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 7181 (Oct. 6, 2005),
https://www.ag.state.mi.us/opinion/datafiles/2000s/op10257.htm.
7 Public Law No. 85-684, 72 Stat. 635 (Aug. 20, 1958).
8 See American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, Driver License Compacts,
https://www.aamva.org/Drivers-License-Compacts.
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of Columbia have entered into a Driver License Compact. 9 It provides for
notification of one participating state’s suspension of a driver’s license to authorities
in the others. It also calls for communication of out-of-state traffic violations to the
jurisdiction in which the driver is licensed. 10 (This information exchange has been
facilitated by a National Driver Register established by Congress in 1960, 11 and
later expanded. 12) Also widely adopted is the Nonresident Violator Compact. Its
aim is to assure that out-of-state motorists receive non-discriminatory treatment in
the enforcement of minor traffic violations. 13 A third compact, the Vehicle
Equipment Safety Compact, was eclipsed by the shift to federally imposed safety
standards under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. 14
2. Federal Motor Vehicle Standards
Pursuant to that legislation, a federal agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), has, for over half a century, set safety standards for most
new motor vehicles sold in or imported into the U.S. 15 By regulating the latest
equipment offered for sale, over time this agency limits what can be driven on the
nation’s roads. Tire-pressure monitoring, 16 electronic stability control systems, 17
substantial capacity to withstand impact from the side, 18 and head restraints 19 are
among the features that its standards now require in new automobiles. Motorcycles
and mopeds must also meet NHTSA standards. 20 The same federal agency tests
and rates new car models on how they fare in a crash and issues recalls following a

9 See Driver License Compact, http://apps.csg.org/ncic/Compact.aspx?id=56. The exceptions are
Georgia, Maine, Michigan, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See id.
10 See id.
11 Pub. L. No. 86-660, 74 Stat. 526. See Edward C. Fisher & Robert H. Reeder, VEHICLE TRAFFIC LAW
47 (1974).
12 See id. The register is now maintained by a unit of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. See National Driver Register Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-364, 96 Stat. 1741;
National Driver Register (NDR), https://one.nhtsa.gov/Data/National-Driver-Register-(NDR).
13 See Nonresident Violator Compact, http://apps.csg.org/ncic/Compact.aspx?id=142.
14 Pub. L. No. 89–563, 80 Stat. 718.
15 That authority is now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30111. The standards are set forth in
49 C.F.R. Part 571.
16 See 49 C.F.R. § 571.138.
17 See 49 C.F.R. § 571.126.
18 See 49 C.F.R. § 571.214.
19 See 49 C.F.R. § 571.202a.
20 See 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.122, 571.122a, 571.123.
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determination that a particular vehicle type or component has defects posing safety
risks. 21
In 1981 NHTSA standardized the previously haphazard system of assigning unique
identification numbers to motor vehicles sold in the U.S. 22 As standardized, the
vehicle identification number or VIN not only supports the federal agency’s
responsibility to identify and recall models and components involved in repeated
crashes and stolen vehicle tracing, 23 but it also furnishes the basis for state systems
of vehicle titling and registration. 24
The agency’s regulatory authority extends to all “motor vehicles,” a phrase defined
by statute to embrace any “vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and
manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but [not
including] … a vehicle operated only on a rail line.” 25 Embedded in that definition
are two important limits (in addition to the exclusion of street railways). The first
(“mechanical power”) removes human or animal propelled vehicles (such as bicycles
or horse-drawn carts) from the scope of the agency’s authority. The second
(“primarily for use on public streets …”) excludes motorized vehicles designed and
marketed for off-road use (golf carts and dirt bikes, for example). They, along with
bicycles and other non-motorized vehicles acquired and used by individual
consumers are subject to the product safety jurisdiction of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC). 26 Standards for fork-lifts and other powered vehicles
used in industrial settings and for vehicles used in commercial agriculture are set

21 See generally Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, From Command and Control to Collaboration
and Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 167 (2017).
22 See 49 C.F.R. §§ 565.1 – 565.16.
23 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs),
https://one.nhtsa.gov/Vehicle-Safety/Vehicle%E2%80%93Related-Theft/Vehicle-IdentificationNumbers-(VINs).
24 See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-116; Okla. Stat. Tit. 47, § 1105.2.
25 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(7).
26 The statutory division of authority between the Consumer Product Safety Commission and the
National Highway Safety Administration draws this line. Specifically excluded from the spectrum of
consumer products subject to regulation by the former are “motor vehicles” and “motor vehicle
equipment” as defined in the statute setting out the mandate of the second. See 15 U.S.C. §
2052(a)(5)(C). For the unique history of the SPSC bicycle safety standards, see Bruce Epperson, The
Great Schism: Federal Bicycle Safety Regulation and the Unraveling of American Bicycle Planning,
37 TRANSP. L. J. 73 (2010).
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by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). 27 The phrase
“primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways” has, however, allowed
NHTSA to expand its regulatory authority without Congressional action as states
have allowed new types of vehicles onto their roadways. 28
In theory, at least, federal motor vehicle standards and recall authority concern the
soundness and safety of vehicles and their equipment; state law governs use. 29
Federal law sets detailed standards for the seat belts in new cars. 30 State “buckle
up” laws (induced by federal grant money used as a positive incentive 31 and a series
of earlier more coercive measures 32) command their use. 33
3. Use of Federal Highway Funds to Induce Changes in State Motor Vehicle Laws
Over the past century, federal grants to states and localities have had a powerful
influence on the public infrastructure available for vehicular travel. 34 In addition,
from time to time Congress has used the threat of reducing or withholding federal
highway money to pressure states into adopting and enforcing laws that bear on

See, e,g,, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.178, 1928.51.
As the agency’s chief counsel explained in 1971: “We view a dune buggy as a ‘motor vehicle’
primarily because it is licensable for use on the public roads. Conversely all-terrain vehicles,
snowmobiles, and some categories of mini-bikes are not considered ‘motor vehicles’ because of State
statutory prohibitions forbidding their registration for on-road use.” Letter from Lawrence R.
Schneider, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Messrs. Hill, Lewis, Adams, Goodrich & Tait, June 15, 1971,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/nht71-137.
29 With the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s standards for bicycles this distinction has
allowed states to require lights on bicycles ridden at night even though they are not included in the
CPSC’s bicycle standard. See Forester v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 559 F.2d 774, 798
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
30 See 49 C.F.R. § 571.209. These standards and those for airbags were a target for Reagan era
deregulation, an effort rebuffed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
31 See 23 U.S.C. § 153. The same provision encourages states to require motorcyclists to wear
helmets. See id. Constitutional challenges to state buckle-up and motorcycle helmet laws have
almost uniformly failed. See, e.g., People v. Kohrig, 113 Ill. 2d 384, 498 N.E.2d 1158 (1986) (holding
state buckle-up law constitutional); State v. Fetterly, 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996 (1969) (holding state
motorcycle helmet law constitutional).
32 See David Roos, When New Seat Belt Laws Drew Fire as a Violation of Personal Freedom (
Aug. 31, 2020), HISTORY, https://www.history.com/news/seat-belt-laws-resistance.
33 All states except New Hampshire have some form of seat belt mandate. See IIHS/HLDI, Seat
Belts, https://www.iihs.org/topics/seat-belts#laws.
34 See generally Congressional Research Service, Federal-Aid Highway Program (FAHP): In Brief
(March 1, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44332.
27
28
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road safety. A 1966 act 35 applied this technique to numerous features of state
traffic law administration, ranging from driver education and licensing to highway
design. It provided funding for state highway safety programs and required every
state to implement one by the close of 1998, under penalty of losing federal support.
Qualifying state programs had to meet federal standards, one of which focused very
directly on the lack of uniformity in state codes. That standard required all states
to work toward making “the State's unified rules of the road consistent with similar
unified plans of other States.” 36 Over time those federal standards softened into
guidelines, a shift that Congress acknowledged in a 1987 amendment. 37 The
current guideline contains no reference to interstate consistency. 38
A number of other past federal funding-backed mandates generated such strong
resistance in the states that they were subsequently withdrawn. Many left some
trace behind. In 1974 Congress passed a uniform national speed limit of 55 as an
emergency energy-saving measure. 39 It was widely disregarded by the public,
under-enforced, and strongly opposed by some states. In the years that followed,
Congress relaxed the condition twice, removing it completely in 1995. 40 An earlier
federal requirement that states direct motorcyclists to wear helmets met a similar
fate. It was eliminated in 1975. 41
Most of the federal directives of this sort that have endured concern driving while
impaired. The 1984 act which set a national drinking age of 21 took this form. 42 A
federal statute, dating from 1998, requires states to have and to enforce
prohibitions on driving a motor vehicle (employing that phrase in its broad sense) in
which there is an open container of alcohol. It also induces them to have laws
addressing repeat DUI offenders. Failure to comply can lead to a reduction in a
Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564.
See NHTSA, A Contemporary Overview of Traffic Law Uniformity in the United States: 19681978, 81 (1980).
37 Pub. L. No. 100-17. § 296(a)
38 See NHTSA, Highway Safety Program Guideline No. 6 (April 2014),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/812007c-hspg6-codesandlaws.pdf.
39 Emergency Highway Energy Conservation Act, Public Law No. 93-239, Jan. 2, 1974.
40 See National Highway System Designation Act of 1995 § 205(d), Pub. L. No. 104–59, 109 Stat. 568
(Nov. 28, 1995).
41 See Christopher Ogolla & Frederic Shaw, Is the Repeal of Mandatory Motorcycle Helmet
Legislation a Contributing Factor to Traumatic Brain Injury as a Public Health Problem?, 14 MICH.
ST. J. MED. & LAW 163, 189-90 (2010).
42 See 23 U.S.C. § 158.
35
36
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state’s federal highway fund allocation. 43 A similar incentive formula presses
states to pass laws revoking or suspending drivers’ licenses upon conviction of a
drug offense 44 and setting a blood alcohol standard of .02 percent for drivers under
the age of 21. 45
Other incursions by the U.S. Congress into state vehicle law have been episodic and
limited. A provision tacked onto a federal highway bill in 2005, at the behest of the
car rental industry, preempts any state law imposing liability on those renting or
leasing “motor vehicles” solely on the basis of their customers’ negligence. 46
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has also influenced the states
through non-coercive persuasion. That has been its approach to traffic law
adjudication. Fifty years ago, violations of state and local traffic rules were
commonly treated as crimes – misdemeanors mostly, but felonies in the case of
more serious offenses. In the early 1970s, implementing a recommendation of a
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals and a task
force of its own, 47 NHTSA began encouraging states to decriminalize most traffic
offenses and transfer their adjudication to administrative officials. 48 Close to half
the states have made this change. 49 Even in those doing so, more serious offenses,
such as DUI, driving an unregistered vehicle or without a valid driver's license, and
reckless driving, remain crimes. 50
4. The ADA’s Accessibility Requirements
For individuals with mobility impairments and all others traveling along sidewalks,
especially those pushing, pulling, or riding on wheeled devices, the most significant
federal mobility legislation has been the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

See 23 U.S.C. §§ 154, 164; 23 C.F.R. §§ 1270.1 – 1270.9, 1275.1 – 1275.9.
See 23 U.S.C. § 159.
45 See 23 U.S.C. § 161.
46 49 U.S.C. § 30106.
47 See Robert Force, Administrative Adjudication of Traffic Violations Confronts the Doctrine of
Separation of Powers, 49 TULANE L. REV. 84 (1974).
48 See National Highway Tr8ffic Safety Administration, Dept. of Transportation, New Trends in
Advanced Adjudication Techniques (1974),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/58495NCJRS.pdf
49 See Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA
L. REV. 672, 698 (2015)
50 Id. The 2000 Uniform Vehicle Code § 11-102 n. 72 provides optional language for states taking the
decriminalization approach.
43
44
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(ADA). 51 While it had precursors, they were tied to federal funding. 52 The ADA’s
ban on discrimination against disabled individuals in the provision of public
services contains no such limit and extends to the full range of activities carried out
by states and local units of government. 53 As interpreted by the federal courts and
the Department of Justice, its mandate applies to the construction, alteration, and
use of the public right of way, including, importantly, public sidewalks. 54 The law
propelled widespread introduction of curb ramps and the implementation of
sidewalk standards facilitating the mobility of individuals with impairments,
especially those using wheelchairs and alternative wheeled devices. The ADA’s
private cause of action made it possible for individuals frustrated by failures in local
implementation and federal enforcement to seek and obtain judicial relief. 55 In
recent decades, such actions have targeted the official authorization or acceptance
of sidewalk conditions that unreasonably interfere with use by the visually or
mobility impaired. 56
As late as 1979, laws in only a handful of states addressed motorized wheelchairs,
exempting them and those using them from requirements that applied to motor
vehicles, generally. 57 By the early part of this century that had changed. 58 A 2010
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
The Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, applied to accessibility barriers
in federally funded facilities and buildings. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§
4151-4157, required all federally funded highway projects that involved sidewalks to include curb
ramps.
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Frame v. City of Arlington, 575 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding
that “a city’s curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots constitute a service, program, or activity” covered by
the ADA).
54 See id. See also Hamer v. City of Trinidad, 441 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (D. Col. 2020); Mote v. City of
Chelsea, 284 F. Supp. 3d 863 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
55 See Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2004).
56 See Hamer v. City of Trinidad, 441 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (D. Col. 2020); Mote v. City of Chelsea, 284 F.
Supp. 3d 863 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
57 Those states were New York (which excluded “electrically driven invalid chairs … operated or
driven by an invalid” from its “motor vehicle” definition) and Nebraska (which also excluded “selfpropelled invalid chairs”). See National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances,
TRAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED 12 (1979). A few years later New York substituted the term “wheelchair”
and defined it expansively focusing not on the device itself but on the reason for its use. The new
and still current definition extends to “any manual or electrically driven mobility assistance device,
scooter, tricycle or similar device used by a person with a disability as a substitute for walking,”
defining “electrically driven mobility assistance device” as “any wheeled, electrically powered device
designed to enable a person with a disability to move from place to place.” N.Y. Veh. & Tr. § 130-a
(added in 1985).
51
52
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Department of Justice regulation interpreting the ADA explicitly directs state and
local governments to allow the use of powered “wheelchairs and manually-powered
mobility aids” in “areas open to pedestrian use.” 59 The Department’s earlier
insistence that a community’s alteration of sidewalks or streets required the
installation of curb ramps at affected intersections 60 rested on an understanding
that wheelchairs, including those with motors belonged on sidewalks, not in the
roadway. 61
C. State Vehicle and Traffic Laws
1. A Common Structure, Diversity in Detail
Because state and local vehicle and traffic laws figure so prominently today and
federal efforts to induce interstate uniformity during the prior century were shortlived and of limited effect, the rules governing the means and methods of individual,
non-automotive, mobility vary significantly across the country. Some of the
differences are a consequence of geography and climate. Florida does not regulate
the use of snowmobiles; Michigan does, quite extensively. 62 Other differences can
be attributed to demographic and cultural variables. Pennsylvania, home to
significant Amish and Mennonite populations, provides clear legal guidance for
those traveling in horse-drawn vehicles. 63 Many states do not. Arizona law allows
residents in some of the state’s numerous retirement communities to drive ordinary
golf carts on public streets. 64 New York bans them from public streets and

See, e.g., 1997 R.I. Pub. Laws 186; 2005 Mt. Laws 233; 1991 Ore. Laws 417; 2003 Wa. Ch. 141.
20 C.F.R. § 35.137.
60 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(i).
61 Department of Justice/Department of Transportation Joint Technical Assistance1 on the Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act Requirements to Provide Curb Ramps when Streets, Roads, or
Highways are Altered through Resurfacing (July 8, 2013), https://www.ada.gov/doj-fhwa-ta.htm.
Even so, in early 2021, the Alabama Supreme Court counted eight states (including Alabama) that
had neither removed powered wheelchairs from their “motor vehicle” category nor granted them the
same status as pedestrians. Pruitt v. Oliver, 331 So.3d 99 (Ala. 2021). at notes 7, 9, 10. (In Alabama
and elsewhere “motor vehicles” are denied use of sidewalks. See Ala. Code § 32-5A-52.)
62 See Mich. Comp. Laws § 324.82119; Mich. Dept. of Natural Resources, Michigan Snowmobile
Regulations, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/dnr/SnowmobileRegs_268169_7.pdf.
63 See 75 Penn. Cons. Stat. § 3103; Penn. Dept. of Trans., Horse and Buggy Driver’s Manual, PUB
632 (4-19), https://www.dot.state.pa.us/public/PubsForms/Publications/PUB%20632.pdf.
64 See Sun City residents celebrate new golf-cart law (8/14/2014), azcentral,
https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/surprise/2014/08/14/golf-carts-rule-roads-suncity/14095291/; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-101(33) (defined); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-721(C) (use in an age58
59
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highways altogether. 65 Florida leaves the decision up to its municipalities. 66 States
with large scale agriculture are more likely than those that are predominantly
urban to have detailed statutory provisions governing the movement of tractors,
self-propelled farm equipment, and livestock across or along public roadways. 67 The
presence of major mining operations in a state will, in all likelihood, be reflected in
its motor vehicle code. 68
Over most of the past century a non-profit membership organization worked to
bring a measure of consistency, along with a sharing of “best practices,” to this legal
diversity through the publication and periodic revision of a Uniform Vehicle Code
(U.V.C.). Like other “uniform” state laws this one merely offered a model,
provisions recommended to state legislatures for their consideration. 69 The U.V.C.
both drew upon and influenced the codes of individual states. For all their
differences, portions of most state vehicle and traffic laws can still be mapped onto
some version of that model. 70 On questions of statutory interpretation, individual

restricted community located in an unincorporated area); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-2153(D)(7) (exempt
from registration).
65 New York’s Vehicle and Traffic Code contains no golf cart exemption. It does allow registration
and restricted highway use of “low speed vehicles,” but ordinary golf carts do not qualify. See N.Y.
Veh. & Traf. L. § 121-f; N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 15 § 102.10.
66 See Fla. Stat. § 316.212.
67 See. e.g., Iowa Code § 321.18(3); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 301.029; Mont. Code §§ 61-8-101(3), 61-9-215.
68 See. e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-675; W. Va. Code §§ 17C-17A-1 — 17C-17A-16).
69 The principal and most influential source of “uniform” laws recommended to the states for
adoption is the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (the Uniform Law
Commission or ULC), established in 1892. Until quite recently that body stayed away from vehicle
and traffic law, leaving the field entirely to the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and
Ordinances (NCUTLO). Since the demise of NCUTLO it has published two uniform laws in this
field: a Uniform Certificate of Title Act in 2005 and a Uniform Automated Operation of Vehicles Act
in 2019. See Uniform Law Commission, Certificate of Title Act,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?communitykey=ef602e46-b990-4405b789-3a44c5149cd3&tab=groupdetails; Automated Operation of Vehicles Act,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?communitykey=4e70cf8e-a3f4-4c559d27-fb3e2ab241d6&tab=groupdetails. Neither has yet been adopted by a single state.
70 Due to the code’s periodic revision, state legislation based on successive versions can embody
important points of difference. The definition of “bicycle” furnishes one example. A definition of
"bicycle" was added to the Uniform Code in 1944. It was amended in 1968, and then again,
significantly, in 1975. The 1979 annotated code counted two states that employed the then current
version, eight states that used the 1968 version, nine that had stuck with the original, nineteen
states with definitions following an altogether different pattern, and eleven with no comparable
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state courts will, at times, turn to its provisions for guidance. 71 The Federal
Highway Administration’s Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices makes
repeated reference to its terminology, 72 and the twentieth century effort by the
Department of Transportation to achieve greater uniformity in state rules of the
road referred specifically to its provisions. 73
The original U.V.C. was prepared in response to a 1924 national conference
convened by then-Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, and approved by a
successor conference two years later. 74 Burgeoning use of the automobile was the
catalyst. Throughout the balance of the twentieth century, a National Committee
on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances (NCUTLO) carried the project forward,
issuing occasional revisions of the recommended code and publishing annotated
versions that arrayed state vehicle laws against its framework. NCUTLO
comprised representatives of federal, state and local governmental units, together
with a diversity of private entities. The latter ranged from motor clubs and safety
councils to automobile manufacturers and dealers.
In 2000, following publication of a “millennium edition” of the U.V.C., NCUTLO
ceased operations. In the years since, the very years during which a growing and
diverse population of wheeled, electrically powered mobility devices have sought
room on the nation’s roadways, sidewalks, and bicycle paths, the states and their
municipalities have largely been left to address the terms and conditions of their
use individually. 75 The only forces pressing for a common approach have been
focused lobbying efforts by commercial interests, each promoting the use of a
particular type of battery-powered device.

provision. National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, TRAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED
1 – 3 (1979). Major consequences can flow from such differences.
71 See, e.g., Borelli v. Renaldi, 336 Conn. 1 (2020); State v. Montano, 2018-NMCA-047, 423 P.3d 1
(deputy sheriff's display of badge was not the same as being in uniform); Epperson v. Utley, 191 Neb.
413 (1974) (whether traveling at excessive speed forfeits the right-of-way).
72 See, e.g., Federal Highway Administration, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices §§ 1A.13,
3B.01, 9B.06 (2009).
73 See NHTSA, A Contemporary Overview of Traffic Law Uniformity in the United States: 19681978, 81 (1980).
74 See Edward C. Fisher & Robert H. Reeder, VEHICLE TRAFFIC LAW 24 (1974).
75 The same is true for post-2000 changes in road design that have implications for traffic rules. See
Noble v. State, 357 P.3d 1201 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015) (whether turn signal requirements apply to
roundabouts).
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2. Principal Elements of a Typical Turn-of-the-Century Vehicle Code
The 2000 Uniform Vehicle Code and most of its contemporary state variants
categorized all shared public thoroughfares and their components. Streets, roads,
and highways (synonymous terms under the legislation of most states) had, at their
core, the “roadway,” that portion designed and used for vehicular travel. 76 Most
roadways were divided into two or more lanes. 77 Some had lanes “designated for
the exclusive or preferential use of persons operating bicycles.” 78 Divided highways
had two roadways. Alongside some roadways, conceptually part of the street or
road, were segments termed berm, shoulder, or sidewalk. 79 The “sidewalk” portion
was that area between the roadway and adjacent property “intended for use by
pedestrians.” 80 Travelers were separated into two main categories: those using
“vehicles” and “pedestrians.” 81 “Motor vehicles” were a defined subclass of vehicles
– namely, those that were self-propelled. 82 Motor vehicles were subject to
requirements that did not apply to vehicles propelled solely by muscular power
(animal or human). With a few exceptions, motor vehicles driven on public roads
had to be registered with a motor vehicle bureau or department 83 and to be
registered they had to meet a range of requirements. These included compliance
with equipment standards (pertaining to brakes, headlights, tail lights, brake
lights, vehicle identification number, and so on) and, in many states, the owner’s
possession of liability insurance covering future harm caused to third parties. 84
Those operating a motor vehicle on public roads had to be licensed by the same
state agency. 85 It screened prospective licensees for knowledge of the jurisdiction’s
traffic laws, for adequate vision, and for demonstrated competence in operating a
motor vehicle of the type covered by the license. 86 Movement of non-motor vehicles
along public roads was also regulated. Except in rare cases, however, they were not

See U.V.C. § 1-186.
See U.V.C. § 1-147.
78 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 316.003(5); Ga. Code Ann. § 40-1-1(6.1).
79 See U.V.C. § 1-186
80 U.V.C. § 1-193.
81 See U.V.C. §§ 1-168, 1-215.
82 See U.V.C. § 1-156.
83 See U.V.C. §§ 3-301 - 3-812.
84 See U.V.C. §§ 7-101 - 7-105.
85 See U.V.C. §§ 6-101 - 6-215.
86 See U.V.C. § 6-105.
76
77
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required to be registered or insured nor did their operators have to hold a state
license.
In most states, bicycles were a defined subclass of non-motor vehicle. 87 Motorcycles
were a defined subclass of motor vehicle, 88 as were buses, passenger cars, and
trucks. 89 Pedestrians and non-motor vehicles were permitted to use the sidewalk
portion of a road, highway, or street. Indeed, pedestrians were directed to do so if
there was one. 90 In the absence of a sidewalk, pedestrians were directed to walk on
a road’s shoulder or far edge and if the road was two-way, on the far left, moving
against vehicular traffic. 91 Specified portions of the roadway upon which
pedestrians were permitted to move from one side to the other were termed
“crosswalks.” 92
In general, sidewalks were reserved for pedestrians; driving a vehicle on one was
forbidden with three exceptions. 93 The first allowed vehicles using a driveway to
pass over a sidewalk on the way to a roadway, 94 so long as pedestrians were given
the right of way. 95 A second allowed vehicles “moved exclusively by human power”
(e.g., bicycles and tricycles, in-line skates, strollers, skateboards, and toy wagons) to
travel along sidewalks. 96 The third, for “any motorized wheelchair,” 97 reflected the
impact of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act, and the disability rights
movement that culminated in its enactment. (Earlier versions of the Code
contained only the first two exceptions, 98 and to this day that remains true of a
handful state statutes. 99)

See U.V.C. § 1-109.
See U.V.C. § 1-157.
89 See U.V.C. §§ 1-110, 1-167, 1-211.
90 See U.V.C. § 11-506.
91 Id.
92 See U.V.C. § 1-118/
93 See U.V.C. § 11-1103.
94 Id.
95 See U.V.C. § 11-509.
96 See U.V.C. § 11-1103.
97 Id.
98 See U.V.C. § 11-1103 (1979).
99 See infra p. 17 n. 308.
87
88
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On the roadway, motor vehicle operators had to comply with codified “rules of the
road,” 100 with speed limits, 101 and with traffic signs and signals – both human and
automated. 102 In addition, criminal penalties backed important public safety
mandates, including prohibitions on operating a vehicle under the influence of
alcohol or other drugs, 103 on driving recklessly, 104 and on leaving the scene of a
collision. 105 License revocation was employed in serious cases, alongside criminal
penalties, serving both as a deterrent and a means of removing the hazard posed by
repeat offenders. 106
3. Local Government Authority to Adjust or Add to the Statewide Rules
While the basic framework established by a motor vehicle code applied throughout
the enacting state, 107 most states granted municipalities significant authority to
apply and adapt the code’s general provisions and to add their own (not
inconsistent) regulations “with respect to streets and highways within their
jurisdiction.” 108
4. Treatment of Smaller Modes of Motorized Transportation
Motorcycles and their less powerful relatives faced requirements similar and in
many respects identical to those applied to automobiles and their operators. The
Uniform Code arrayed these non-automotive vehicles in nested categories.
“Motorcycle” was its all-inclusive term for motor vehicles with two or three wheels
and a saddle for the rider. 109
5. Bicycles
The original 1926 Uniform Vehicle Code explicitly included bicycles (and “ridden
animals”) within its vehicle definition. 110 That subjected their riders to all
generally applicable rules of the road except those limited to “motor vehicles.” In
See U.V.C. §§ 11-301 – 11-705.
See U.V.C. §§ 11-801 – 11-809.
102 See U.V.C. §§ 11-103, 11-201 – 11-201.
103 See U.V.C. §§ 11-901 – 11-908.
104 See U.V.C. § 11-909.
105 See U.V.C. §§ 10-101 – 10-109 (2000). Recent years have seen the use of mobile phones and other
electronic devices added to the list in many states.
106 See generally U.V.C. §§ 6-201 – 6-215.
107 U.V.C. § 15-101.
108 U.V.C. § 15-102. See, e.g., Colo. Stat. § 42-4-110.
109 See U.V.C. § 1-157.
110 NCUTLO, TRAFFIC LAWS ANNOTATED 26 (1979).
100
101
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the 1930 revision bicycles were removed from the “vehicle” category, along with all
other devices “moved by human power.” 111 In 1975, perhaps in response to the
resurgence of adult bicycle use, they and other human-powered devices were
brought back into the U.V.C.’s “vehicle” definition. 112 Simultaneously the code
provision banning the driving of vehicles on sidewalks was revised to allow those
propelled “by human power.” 113 Throughout these revisions, persons operating
bicycles (and other non-motorized vehicles) on public roadways were subject to the
traffic rules that applied to other vehicles with one vague qualification. It excepted
“those [rules] which by their very nature can have no application.” 114 In addition,
the U.V.C. (and state codes following its model) set forth a number of rules focused
solely on bicycle equipment and use: directing where and how bicycles should be
ridden (“as far to the right as practicable” on roadways 115 with further restrictions
on sidewalks 116) requiring lights at night, 117 prohibiting clinging to other
vehicles, 118 or carrying objects that prevent having both hands available for
control, 119 for example. 120
6. Other Human-Powered Vehicles
Kick scooters, in-line and traditional roller skates, skateboards, roller skis, hand
pulled wagons, personal shopping carts, strollers and baby buggies – all are
“vehicles” as that term is defined in the typical state code. Just as is true of
bicycles, some can be propelled at speeds that substantially exceed the pace of most
pedestrians, especially on a downward slope. What rules apply to them? Do they
belong on a sidewalk? Can they be taken into the roadway whenever and wherever
bicycles are permitted? Are those using them subject to the rules that apply to
pedestrians?

Id.
Id.
113 Id. at 299.
114 Id. at 316.
115 U.V.C. § 11-1205 (2000).
116 U.V.C. § 11-1209 (2000). For the earlier treatment of bicycles on sidewalks, see National
Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, Traffic Laws Annotated 324-25 (1979).
117 U.V.C. § 12-702 (2000).
118 U.V.C. § 11-1204 (2000).
119 U.V.C. § 11-1207 (2000).
120 For a recent survey of bicycle law, see Ken McLeod, Bicycle Laws in the United States - Past,
Present, and Future 42 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 869 (2015).
111
112
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The common definition of “pedestrian” is limited to those “afoot.” 121 Even though
feet are unquestionably involved in the use of roller skates and skateboards there
would seem little doubt that while traveling on them the skater or boarder is
operating a vehicle and, therefore, is not subject to such requirements as one
directing pedestrians to use the sidewalk where one is available. 122 That makes the
roadway an option; however, since these are human-powered vehicles their users
are, in most states, not denied the sidewalk. 123
Acknowledgment of the immense variety of human-powered vehicles appeared in
two U.V.C. provisions widely adopted by the states. The first is a broad prohibition
on attaching oneself to a motor vehicle. Not limited to bicyclists, it typically applies
as well to those riding a “coaster, roller skates, sled or toy vehicle.” 124 The second
authorizes municipal governments to add their own local regulations of “persons
upon skates, coasters, sleds and other toy vehicles” to those that apply statewide. 125
7. How New Forms of Powered Mobility Were Fit into this Structure
By the middle of the twentieth century, the legislation organizing this multicategory matrix of space, travelers, and vehicles had grown sufficiently intricate
that altering it to accommodate some fresh form of powered mobility that state
lawmakers sought to allow onto roadways or sidewalks on appropriate terms called
for clarity and precision. 126 During the period of periodic Uniform Vehicle Code
revision, three personal mobility innovations prompted such adjustment by large
numbers of states, although not all of them nor in the same manner. These were
the motorized bicycle or moped, the powered wheelchair, and the four-wheel low-

U.V.C. § 1-168 (2000). See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1589.
U.V.C. § 11-506 (2000). But see Fla. Stat. § 316.2065(12) (prohibiting individuals “upon roller
skates, or riding in or by means of any coaster, toy vehicle, or similar device, [to] go upon any
roadway except while crossing a street on a crosswalk”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 300.090 (same); R.I. Gen.
Laws § 31-19-19 (same).
123 U.V.C. § 11-506 (2000). But see Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-1103 (b)(2) (limiting bicycles, play
vehicles, or unicycles to sidewalks “where allowed by local ordinance”).
124 U.V.C. § 11-1204(a) (2000).
125 U.V.C. § 11-1502(a)(21) (2000).
126 So complicated that some state legislatures attempting change amended the wrong portion of
their motor vehicle code. See, e.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 39-06.2-02(26) (adopted in 1989) which
excludes “motorized wheelchairs” from the definition of “motor vehicle.” N.D.S.L. 1989, ch. 461, § 4.
The exclusion appears a set of definitions that apply to the licensing of commercial drivers and not
the definitions that apply to the motor vehicle ti tle. As a consequence, its effect, if any, is unclear.
Compare N.D. Cent. Code § 39-06.2-02(47).
121
122
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speed (neighborhood) vehicle. The first two were addressed in the Uniform Vehicle
Code’s final edition. As with other matters, their U.V.C. treatment both tracked
and influenced amendments to state motor vehicle legislation. The federal
regulatory change that enabled the third occurred so close to the compilation of the
U.V.C.’s final edition that no reference to four-wheeled low-speed or neighborhood
electric vehicles appears in its provisions. Yet over a short span of years such a
vehicle category was added to the motor vehicle codes and allowed onto some
roadways in a majority of states. 127
a. Motorized Bicycles
The earliest of these second-half-of-the-century new categories was the motorized
bicycle or moped, originally a bicycle to which a small gasoline engine had been
attached. Such powered low-speed vehicles became popular in the years
immediately following World War II, as did a somewhat faster, more stylized,
purpose-built form, during the oil crisis of the 1970s. Both types were brought
under the Uniform Vehicle Code as distinct categories of motorcycle (initially,
“motor-driven cycle” – added in 1948 128 – and, later, “moped” 129). Under the U.V.C.
these vehicle categories had scaled-down equipment requirements, 130 distinctive
license plates that set them apart from other motorcycles, 131 and a separate class of
operator’s license. 132 Their operators were directed to ride as far to the right as
possible when proceeding at less than the speed of traffic 133 and to make left turns
in the same cautious fashion as a cyclist. 134 They were specifically authorized to
use bicycle lanes. 135 Altering a moped to increase its speed above 30 mph was
specifically forbidden. 136 At least in the early years, a few states adopted a more
radical approach and simply removed “motorized bicycles” (Indiana, Ohio,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oklahoma), “bicycles equipped with an
assisting motor” (Maryland), “bicycles with helper motors” (Connecticut, North
See James J. Fazzalaro, Low Speed Electric Vehicles, Conn. Office of Legal Research Report (Aug.
8, 2009), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0432.htm.
128 U.V.C. § 1-158.
129 U.V.C. § 1-154.
130 See U.V.C. § 12-506.
131 See U.V.C. § 3-142(f).
132 See U.V.C. § 6-104(a)(4).
133 See U.V.C. § 11-1205(a).
134 See U.V.C. § 11-1208.
135 See U.V.C. § 11-1212.
136 See.U.V.C. § 12-508.
127
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Carolina), or “mopeds” (Florida, New Hampshire) from the motor vehicle category
altogether. 137
A majority of states entered the twenty-first century with provisions that addressed
the use of at least one moped-like category of low-speed motorized cycles, sometimes
with a definition requiring operable pedals. 138 Typically, this vehicle class was
subject to registration, but often not insurance, requirements. 139 Moped riders had
to possess a license. 140 Especially with low-powered motorized bicycles, some states
allowed riders as young as 14 to qualify for a license limited to this particular
vehicle class. 141 In terms of federal law, so long as the vehicle had a seat or saddle
and two or three wheels, it fell under National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration’s motorcycle definition and the associated standards for rearview
mirrors, control positioning, and vehicle identification number. 142 Those with
motors producing 5 brake horse power or less, qualified as “motor-driven cycles,” 143
a subcategory to which a separate braking system standard applied. 144
Under the terms of the NHTSA standards and many, if not most, state codes as
they stood in 2000, electric bicycles in their contemporary form would fall under the
moped or motor-driven cycle definition, subject to the same requirements.
b. Electrically Powered Wheelchairs and Mobility Scooters
The accommodation of electrically powered wheelchairs within state motor vehicle
codes is a more complex and, with respect to the micromobility developments of the
twenty-first century, a more influential story. So long as mobility impaired
individuals traveled using wheelchairs or other vehicles propelled by human
muscular power (the user’s or a third party’s) twentieth century motor vehicle codes

See Uniform Vehicle Code Annotated 11-12 (1979).
See. e.g., Del. Code tit. 21, § 101(26): Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4501.01(L); W. Va. Code § 17C-1-5a.
139 See. e.g., Fla. Stat. § 324.021(1); Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Motorcycle and Motor Driven
Cycle Classifications, https://www.in.gov/bmv/registration-plates/vehicle-registrations/motorcyclesand-motor-driven-cycles/motorcycle-and-motor-driven-cycle-classifications/.
140 See. e.g., Mo. Dept. of Revenue, Missouri Driver Guide 9 (2022),
https://dor.mo.gov/forms/Driver%20Guide.pdf.
141 See. e.g., Ark. Dept. of Fin. & Admin., Motorcycle License, https://www.dfa.arkansas.gov/driverservices/license-id-and-permits/motorcycle-license/; S.C., SCDMV, MOPED LICENSE,
https://www.scdmvonline.com/Driver-Services/Moped-License.
142 See 49 C.F.R. § 571.3. Lacking a seat stand-up scooters did not.
143 See id.
144 See 49 C.F.R. § 571.122a.
137
138

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4037752

21
treated them as pedestrians. In the language of the Uniform Vehicle Code, persons
in wheelchairs could use both sidewalks and crosswalks with “all the rights and
duties applicable to a pedestrian under the same circumstances.” 145 Electrically
powered wheelchairs or mobility scooters, on the other hand, fell within the U.V.C.’s
broad definition of “motor vehicle.” As of 1979 only a handful of state statutes
excluded them from “motor vehicle” requirements. The terminology of the few that
did took varying forms. Examples included: "electric battery-operated wheel chairs
when operated by physically handicapped persons at speeds not exceeding fifteen
miles per hour" (Colorado), "self-propelled invalid chairs" (Nebraska), and
"electrically-driven invalid chairs being operated or driven by an invalid (New
York). 146
By 2000 the disability rights movement, the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, and state analogs had induced a majority of states to create a special
exception from motor vehicle regulations for powered wheelchairs and their
equivalents. 147 Section 1-159 of the U.V.C.’s millennium edition removed
“motorized wheelchair[s]” from the otherwise comprehensive definition of “motor
vehicle.” U.V.C. § 11-1103 allowed “motorized wheelchair[s]” to be ridden along
sidewalks, defining the category as “[a]ny self-propelled vehicle designed for, and
used by, a person with disabilities that is incapable of a speed in excess of eight
miles per hour. A number of states followed this approach. 148 The more common
one (not necessarily inconsistent with the first) was to expand the longstanding
definition of “pedestrian” (“any person afoot” 149) to include individuals using
wheelchairs, with or without motors. 150 Under either approach, persons employing
powered wheelchairs became lawful sidewalk and crosswalk users. An important
difference between the two arose when and if wheelchair users found themselves

See U.V.C. § 11-1209(c).
See Uniform Vehicle Code Annotated 11-12 (1979).
147 A 2021 opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court counts
148 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-1(59); Ind. Code § 9-13-2-196 (excluding wheelchairs from the
“vehicle” definition); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 1 (excluding “wheelchairs owned and operated by
invalids” from the “motor vehicle” definition). A 2021 survey by the Alabama Supreme Court
counted a total of five. See Pruitt v. Oliver, 331 So.3d 99, 110-11 n. 10 (Ala. 2021).
149 See U.V.C. § 1-168.
150 See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189.010(8); Idaho Code § 49-117(5); Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-8101(50). The Alabama Supreme Court’s 2021 survey found this to be the approach of a “vast
majority” of states. Pruitt v. Oliver, 331 So.3d 99, 110-11 (Ala. 2021).
145
146
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forced to travel in the roadway because of the absence or poor condition of a
sidewalk. 151
While state vehicle codes define most vehicle categories by size, weight, power, and
such other physical characteristics as number of wheels, they define wheelchairs
principally by who is using them and why. New York’s paired statutory definitions
illustrate that point at the extreme. Within the wheelchair category New York
includes “any manual or electrically driven mobility assistance device, scooter,
tricycle or similar device used by a person with a disability as a substitute for
walking,” and defines “electrically driven mobility assistance device” as “any
wheeled, electrically powered device designed to enable a person with a disability to
move from place to place.” 152 The 2000 U.V.C. employs similarly broad language
but excludes devices capable of speeds in excess of eight miles per hour. 153
Connecticut’s statute removes wheelchairs from the “motor vehicle” category so long
as they are “operated by persons with physical disabilities at speeds not exceeding
fifteen miles per hour.” 154 Kansas includes in the “pedestrian” category anyone
using a “low powered, mechanically propelled vehicle designed specifically for use
by a physically disabled person.” 155
c. Electrically Powered Low-Speed Neighborhood Vehicles
As noted earlier, 156 some states with warm climates and concentrations of retirees
have allowed standard golf carts to be driven along low-speed-limit roadways.
Nonetheless, since the dominant use of this vehicle type was off-road and its
maximum speed fell below 20 mph, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration did not treat golf carts as “motor vehicles” subject to its standards
or other regulations. 157 By the late 1990s the number of states allowing limited use
of golf carts on public roadways had grown to over a dozen. A few had loosened

Classified as pedestrians wheelchair users would be required to proceed on the far left of the
roadway (against the flow of vehicular traffic) under the typical vehicle and traffic code. Classified
as vehicles their proper place is, together with bicycles and other slow vehicles, on the right. See
generally Pruitt v. Oliver, 331 So.3d 99, 104-06 (Ala. 2021).
152 N.Y. Veh. & Tr. L. § 130-a (added in 1985).
153 U.V.C. § 1-159 (2000).
154 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-1(59).
155 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1446.
156 See supra pp. 11-12.
157 See Letter from Jeffrey R. Miller, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to Alexander E. Nagy, April 16, 1985,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/1985-0215.
151
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their definitions of the category to include golf carts that had been modified so that
they could travel as fast as 25 mph. Pressed by a Canadian company, eager to enter
the U.S. market with a 25 mph “neighborhood electric vehicle,” 158 NHTSA launched
a formal rulemaking proceeding in 1996. Two years later, that yielded a new motor
vehicle standard applicable to four-wheeled vehicles (electric or gasoline-powered)
capable of a maximum speed between 20 and 25 mph. 159 Its set of requirements
rather than the far more demanding ones for passenger cars applies to qualifying
“low speed vehicles.” (The agency’s longstanding interpretation excusing “golf
carts” from its regulations still applies to those with a maximum speed no greater
than 20 mph. 160)
States were quick to adopt the new category. 161 In most, use is limited to roadways
with low speed limits (35 mph being the norm); but, in other respects, low-speed
vehicles are governed by the same package of legal requirements as automobiles.
To be driven on public roads, they must to be registered and insured, their drivers,
licensed. 162

III. Twenty-First Century Battery-Powered Disruption
A. First Up: The Segway
With the disappearance of the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and
Ordinances, nation-wide legislative initiative in this domain passed largely to
commercial interests. Model laws dealing with several of this century’s new forms
of powered mobility exist, but they have been drafted on behalf of the companies
that make, sell, or rent the vehicles they cover, not by a consortium of state officials

The company described this as a “two-passenger vehicle, closed at the top but open at the sides,
intended for use on city streets at speeds up to 25 miles per hour.” National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 33194, 33199 (June 17, 1998).
159 See 49 C.F.R. §§ 571.3, 571.500.
160 See 63 Fed. Reg. 33194, 33209.
161 By 2010 they were “street legal” in 46 states. See Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Lowspeed vehicles and minitrucks shouldn't share busy public roads with regular traffic (May 20, 2010),
https://www.iihs.org/news/detail/low-speed-vehicles-and-minitrucks-shouldnt-share-busy-publicroads-with-regular-traffic.
162 See, e.g., Delaware, Dept. of Transportation, Low-Speed Vehicles - Customer Handout (April
2007), https://www.dmv.de.gov/VehicleServices/specialvehicles/pdfs/sb17_low_speed_vehicle.pdf;
Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration, Low Speed Vehicle Application (VR-324 (03-14),
https://mva.maryland.gov/Documents/VR-324.pdf, Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles, Low
speed vehicles, https://www.mass.gov/info-details/low-speed-vehicles#licensing-requirements-.
158
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and others broadly concerned with transportation planning or traffic safety. This
pattern was first established in the early 2000s by the company responsible for the
Segway. Although that novel vehicle never achieved market success to match the
media excitement preceding its introduction, the lobbying effort by the Segway legal
team succeeded in creating a template that has since been adapted to cover other
forms of powered micromobility. Rejecting the approaches employed to achieve
“steet legal” status for the twentieth century’s neighborhood electric vehicle and
motorized bicycle, the Segway team took powered wheelchairs as its model.
The strategy contained two key elements: (1) the interpretation of a key federal
statutory definition and (2) the amendment of two or three interrelated state
statutory definitions.
1. An Initial Hurdle: The Federal Definition of “Motor Vehicle”
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s responsibility for setting
vehicle safety standards and mandating the national system of vehicle
identification numbers is limited to “motor vehicles” as defined in 49 U.S.C.
§ 30102(a)(7). As previously noted, a critical phrase in that definition confines the
category to vehicles “manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and
highways.” The agency does not set standards for power mowers, construction
equipment, or off-road recreational vehicles. 163 The Segway’s inventor, Dean
Kamen, envisioned his powered two-wheeled platform being used in pedestrian
space alongside motorized wheelchairs, including the gyro-stabilized wheelchair
from which the Segway was derived. 164 Early in 2001, the company’s law firm
secured an advisory opinion from NHTSA’s chief counsel. It concurred in the firm’s
conclusion that the Segway was not a “motor vehicle” subject to the agency’s
regulatory authority. The interpretation rested on the location of Segway’s

See Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, NHTSA, to Tim Lau, Importhookup, Jan. 7, 2005,
https://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/Importhookup.2.html; Letter from Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel,
NHTSA, to Ward W. Reeser, Caterpillar Tractor Co., Aug. 8, 1988,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/2793o.
164 See Bob Metcalfe, More than a wheelchair, the IBOT is on the move (Nov. 26, 1999),
http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9911/26/ibot.idg/.
163
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intended use (sidewalks, not the roadway), its limited speed (“less than 20 mph”),
and its unusual configuration. 165
The importance of the latter two factors had already been articulated in prior
NHTSA interpretive opinions involving other powered vehicles with two or three
wheels. A foundational agency interpretation, issued in 1969, had concluded that
powered “mini-bikes” were not “motor vehicles.” 166 In doing so, it set out a multifactor test. Under that test neither the manufacturer’s intent that mini-bikes be
used off-road nor the fact that they possessed the operational capability of being
ridden on public thoroughfares was determinative. Mini-bikes were, NHTSA ruled,
not motor vehicles so long as they failed to meet the requirements of nearly all
states for lawful operation on “public streets, roads, and highways” 167 and were not,
in fact, being operated on them in significant numbers. 168 Subsequent, advisory
opinions concerning motorized kick scooters qualified the second factor, taking the
position that even if such vehicles “regularly use the public roads” they would “not
be considered 'motor vehicles' if [they] have a maximum attainable speed of 20 miles
per hour (mph) or less and an abnormal configuration which readily distinguishes
them from other vehicles.” 169 These are analogous to grounds on which the agency
declined to regulate golf carts as motor vehicles despite their being allowed on
public roads by a fair number of states. (In the agency’s view, such a low speed
would keep the vehicle “from being operated in normal moving traffic.”) 170 Add a
seat to a powered scooter, however, and, in NHTSA’s view, it became a “motor
vehicle” subject to its standards, no matter its top speed. The reason?
[A seat makes the scooter] indistinguishable from a moped, which is an
on-street vehicle that we have long interpreted as a motor vehicle.
Although most mopeds have chain drives, pedal starters, and lower165 See Letter from John Womack, Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA to Eric Rubel, Arnold & Porter,
dated Aug. 3, 2001, https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/07-26-01rubelltrspw; Steve Kemper, CODE
NAME GINGER 302 (2003).
166 See Appendix A - Interpretations, 34 Fed. Reg. 15416 (Oct. 3, 1969).
167 In this and subsequent NHTSA invocations of the statutory phrase “public streets, roads, and
highways” it appears to be viewing it as limited to the roadway portion and not extending to the
sidewalk.
168 See id.
169 See Letter from John Womack, Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA to Mr. Andrew Grubb Steve's
Moped & Bicycle World, dated June 12, 1995, https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/aiam5561.
170 See Letter from Jacqueline Glassman, Chief Counsel, NHTSA to Mr. Amir Ambar, Winbel, Inc.,
dated Nov. 26, 2003, https://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/Winbel_scooter_v5.html.
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mounted engines, we do not think that these distinctions are
important. The seated rider on the power scooter appears to other
traffic to be riding a moped. 171
The Segway raised no concern about such confusion.
2. The Second: 50 State Motor Vehicle Codes
Building on its federal regulatory success, the Segway team launched a nationwide
lobbying campaign targeting state vehicle codes. There, a critical challenge for the
company arose from the comprehensive definitions of “vehicle” and “motor vehicle”
found in the laws of all fifty states. The Uniform Vehicle Code defined a “vehicle” as
“[e]very device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported
or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices used exclusively upon stationary rails
or tracks.” 172 It defined “motor vehicle” as “[e]very vehicle which is self-propelled,
and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead
trolley wires but not operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely by human
power and motorized wheelchairs.” 173 With a degree of variation already described,
most states followed that basic model. For a company that wanted to sell Segways
for use on public sidewalks and roadways, the breadth of those definitions posed
two problems. First, the typical state statute, like the U.V.C., banned “motor
vehicles” or even all “vehicles” not moved “exclusively by human power” (motorized
wheelchairs excepted) from public sidewalks. Second, the types of motor vehicles
that could be driven on public roadways were, typically, subject to registration,
driver’s license, and insurance requirements. The vehicle code amendment
proposed by the Segway team sought to shield the invention from all the above
restrictions, employing the very method the U.V.C. had used with powered
wheelchairs. Their proposed legislative text excluded the Segway quite specifically
from the statutory “motor vehicle” definition. While the name it gave the proposed
excluded category, “electric personal assistive mobility device” (EPAMD)
encouraged association with that established one, the definition was not limited to
use by disabled persons. Ultimately, forty-five states plus the District of Columbia
amended their traffic laws to remove EPAMDs from their statutory definitions of

See id.
U.V.C. § 1-215 (2000).
173 U.V.C. § 1-156 (2000).
171
172
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“motor vehicle.” 174 Some did so directly; 175 others accomplished the same result
through the underlying definition of “vehicle.” 176 Concern about use on roadways
with heavy traffic did prompt a number to attach restrictions on where EPAMDs
could be ridden and on a rider’s age. 177 In most cases the statutory changes allowed
Segways onto sidewalks, sometimes with the proviso that their riders yield the
right-of-way to pedestrians. 178 The Segway motor vehicle carve-out, the critical
definition of “electric personal assistive mobility device,” was tightly drawn. While
there were slight variations from state to state in other details, to qualify as an
EPAMD a device had to have “two non-tandem wheels” and be “self-balancing.” 179
The requirements had one clear purpose and effect, to limit the exception to this
singular patent-protected product 180 while keeping other electrically powered
personal mobility devices, importantly electric bicycles and electric scooters, within
state “motor vehicle” statutory definitions. (Although the original Segway had a
handlebar, that was not a component of the EPAMD definition. This had the
unforeseen consequence, over a decade later, of allowing the popular consumer
product colloquially known as a hoverboard to qualify. 181 As a consequence,
hoverboards had a clear legal path onto the sidewalks of most states. 182)

174 See Governors’ Highway Safety Association, Segway Laws (2015),
https://web.archive.org/web/20150905090718/http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/segway_laws.h
tml.
175 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 316.003(46); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169.011(42)(b); Utah Code Ann. § 416a-102(40(b).
176 See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01(49); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 340.01(74).
177 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 316.2068; Minn. Stat. § 169.212; Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1116; Va. Code
Ann. § 46.2-908.1.
178 See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.660(6).
179 See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.13c.
180 See U.S. Patent No. 8,830,048; U.S. Patent No. 10,370,052B2; Jordan Golson, Segway has gotten a
bunch of products banned in the US for infringing on its patents, THE VERGE, May 16, 2016,
https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/16/11246676/seaway-patent-itc-geo-banned-import.
181 For more about the arrival of the hoverboard, see David Pierce, The Weird Origin Story of the
Viral, Dangerous Hoverboard, WIRED (June 29, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/06/the-weirdstory-of-the-viral-chinese-scooter-phunkeeduck-io-hawk/.
182 It also set off a patent dispute, ultimately resolved by a Chinese competitor’s purchase of the
Segway company. See Curt Woodward, Segway acquired by Chinese competitor, months after
alleging patent infringement, beta Boston (April 15, 2015),
http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/04/15/segway-acquired-by-chinese-competitor-months-afteralleging-patent-infringement/.
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B. Close Behind: Electric Bicycles
In 2002 the manufacturers of electrically powered bicycles sought and obtained
passage of a federal statute that secured, for a defined set of their products, the
same regulatory treatment that a NHTSA interpretation had granted the Segway,
but the agency had consistently withheld from vehicles that resembled mopeds. 183
Public Law No. 107-319, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2085, removed “low-speed electric
bicycles” from the comprehensive definition of “motor vehicle” in 49 U.S.C.
§ 30102(a)(7) and brought them within the regulatory authority of the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, subject to that agency’s standards for conventional,
human-powered bicycles. The act preempted inconsistent state product safety
requirements, 184 but left all regulation of electric bicycle use with the states. 185 To
qualify (and avoid classification as a motorcycle or motor-driven cycle subject to
NHTSA standards 186) a device had to have two or three wheels and fully operable
pedals, be powered by an electric motor of less than 750 watts, and be incapable of a
speed greater than 20 mph “when powered solely by such a motor” (on a paved level
surface with a rider weighing 170 pounds). 187
Although it blocked more stringent state equipment standards, the federal statute
did not by itself achieve any change of status under state vehicle and traffic codes.
Under state statutes, low-speed electric bicycles remained “motor vehicles,”
typically, in the same category as mopeds, motor scooters, and motor-driven cycles.
Without registration and license plates and unless ridden by a licensed operator
they could not lawfully be operated on public roadways. As motor vehicles, they
were also barred from sidewalks.
To address the state law impediment, an industry group prepared a model law and
proceeded to press for its adoption by state legislatures. Pushed by the growth in

183 See Letter from John Womack, Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA to Mr. Andrew Grubb Steve's
Moped & Bicycle World, dated June 12, 1995, https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/aiam5561
184 See 15 U.S.C. § 2085(d).
185 See Electric Bicycle Law Basics, https://peoplefo rbikes.cdn.prismic.io/peopleforbikes/29e81dec5c0b-4b61-a41d-864384d3aecc_E-Bike-Law-Primer_June_2021.pdf.
186 See Letter from Anthony M. Cooke, Chief Counsel, NHTSA to Darby Crow, Crow Cycle Co., dated
April 17, 2008, https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/07-007541as.
187 15 U.S.C. § 2085(b). The statute’s definition of maximum speed was drawn verbatim from the
2001 NHTSA interpretation concluding that EPAMDs were not “motor vehicles.” See Letter from
John Womack, Acting Chief Counsel, NHTSA to Eric Rubel, Arnold & Porter, dated Aug. 3, 2001,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/07-26-01rubelltrspw.
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consumer interest, more and more states have adopted that model’s framework,
some with modification. 188 Employing the EPAMD template, the industry statute
removes qualifying electric bicycles from a state code’s “motor vehicle” category and
all associated statutory provisions. It specifically exempts them from the state’s
financial responsibility, driver’s license, registration, certificate of title, off-highway
vehicle, and license plate requirements. 189 Instead, its provisions treat electric
bicycles as equivalent, in terms of a rider’s rights and duties, to conventional
bicycles. 190 For equipment requirements, the model simply incorporates those
established by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. 191 The statute
subdivides covered electric bicycles into three classes. The first two have a
maximum power-assisted speed of 20 mph, being differentiated according to
whether the rider must pedal to engage the motor. The third class has a higher
power-assisted maximum (28 mph when powered by both pedal and motor) and is
subject to additional restrictions. 192 These include a minimum age, 193 the
mandatory wearing of a helmet, 194 and possible local government limitation of use

peopleforbikes, Model Electric Bicycle Law with Classes,
https://peopleforbikes.cdn.prismic.io/peopleforbikes/3686d20b-5695-47c1-b0c7-ffe06402be55_ModeleBike-Legislation-Jan2020.pdf. As of April, 2019, sixteen states had adopted a version. Email from
Morgan Lommele, Director of State and Local Policy, PeopleForBikes to the author, April 19, 2019.
By February 2022, the count had risen to 36. See Ashley Seaward, Model Electric Bicycle Laws Now
in 36 States, https://www.peopleforbikes.org/news/model-electric-bicycle-laws-now-in-34-states.
189 Model Electric Bicycle Law with Classes § 202.
190 Id. § 201.
191 Id. § 201.
192 As NHTSA has interpreted the 2002 statute placing low-speed electric bicycles under the
regulatory authority of the Consumer Products Safety Commission, these faster electric bicycles are
still not “motor vehicles” because the rider must continue to pedal. See Letter from Anthony M.
Cooke, Chief Counsel, NHTSA to Howard Seligman, Velosolex America, LLC, dated Sept. 17, 2007,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/07-001825as. The federal statute’s cap of 20 mph applies to
electric bicycles “when powered solely by ... a motor.” 15 U.S.C. § 2085(b) (emphasis added). On the
other hand, NHTSA considers electric bicycles or scooters with greater potential speed that are held
to the 20 mph cap by means of a governor or an adjustable setting as failing to meet the statutory
criterion. See Letter from Anthony M. Cooke, Chief Counsel, NHTSA to Damian J. Pelegrino,
President, Top Cargo Inc., dated Jan. 16, 2009, https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/07-2601rubelltrspw.
193 Model Electric Bicycle Law with Classes § 301 (sixteen).
194 Id. § 302.
188
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on bicycle paths. 195 In addition, the model statute requires that these faster electric
bicycles be equipped with a speedometer. 196
C. 2018: Electrically-Powered Standup Scooters (Available for On-Demand Rental)
1. Federal Highway Traffic Safety Administration Motor Vehicle Standards No Longer a Concern
The Congressional decision to remove low speed electric bicycles from the class of
motor vehicles subject to NHTSA regulation, prompted that agency to revise its
approach to all small vehicles with two or three wheels. It moved to a simple speed
threshold. Under a "tentative interpretation" that has guided NHTSA's exercise of
its statutory mandate since 2005, two- or three-wheeled vehicles with "a maximum
speed capability of less than 20 mph" are not consider motor vehicles "regardless of
on-road capabilities." 197
NHTSA’s adoption of this “bright line rule” left all low-speed scooter equipment
safety issues to the Consumer Products Safety Commission. While the CPSC had a
set of existing bicycle standards to which electric bicycles were subjected by the
2002 legislation placing them under that agency’s jurisdiction, 198 it had (and still
has) no regulations governing scooters.
2. A Different Approach to State Law: On-Demand Rental, Build the Market, Force Law to Follow
While powered standup scooters had been on the U.S. market and a limited
unsanctioned presence on U.S. roadways for over a decade, 2018 brought electric
scooters to the streets of the nation’s urban areas in numbers that could not be
ignored. Moreover, their distribution in public space for on demand, short term
rental, represented a very different approach to legal impediments. Following the
Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb strategy, Bird, Lime, and their early “scooter-share”
competitors endeavored to build consumer demand without pausing over the legal
issues, trusting that popular success would force lawmakers to respond. 199 It

Id. § 208.
Id. § 303.
197 See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Department of Transportation, Two- and
Three-Wheeled Vehicles, 70 Fed. Reg. 34810 (June 15, 2005). This interpretation continues to reflect
the agency’s position. See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Importation and
Certification FAQs, Group 2: Motorcycles and Scooters, https://www.nhtsa.gov/importingvehicle/importation-and-certification-faqs-0.
198 See 15 U.S.C. § 2085(a).
199 See Umair Irfan, Electric scooters’ sudden invasion of American cities, explained, Vox,
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/27/17676670/electric-scooter-rental-bird-lime-skip-spin-cities.
195
196
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helped that the first two companies pursuing this business model, Bird and Lime,
were based in California where the vehicle code already contained a “motorized
scooter” category, 200 to which the state’s “financial responsibility, registration, and
license plate requirements” did not apply. 201 However, the scooter-share companies
did not limit themselves to California. Bird’s founder hailed from Wisconsin and in
late June 2018, his company placed a hundred or more of its rental, powered
scooters on Milwaukee sidewalks. 202 The city threatened to impound them and fine
riders. Bird persisted; the city sued. 203 Milwaukee’s legal position rested on two
points. First, any commercial activity occupying public sidewalks (restaurant
tables, newspaper vending machines, and so on) required a city license. Bird did
not have one. Second, under state law, electric scooters fell within the motor vehicle
category. Wisconsin law prohibited driving motor vehicles on sidewalks. Nor were
roadways an option since these vehicles failed to meet state requirements for motor
vehicle registration. The parties settled. Bird withdrew. 204 The following year,
Wisconsin amended the state’s motor vehicle law to allow electric scooters to use its
streets and roads, subject to additional local regulation. The legislation specifically
authorized local governments to regulate or prohibit the short-term rental of electric
scooters and the use of electric scooters on sidewalks or bicycle paths within their
jurisdiction. 205 In the summer of 2019, electric scooters from Bird, Lime and others
returned to Milwaukee, licensed by the city under a pilot program. 206 Later, a
similar scenario played out in Honolulu, where the city resisted the introduction of

Cal. Veh. Code § 407.5.
Cal. Veh. Code § 21224. The California statute did require (as it still does) that those operating
scooters have a driver’s license or learner’s permit. Cal. Veh. Code § 21235(d).
202 See James B. Nelson & Mary Spicuzza, Bird scooters arrive in downtown Milwaukee, but city
attorney says they're illegal to use on streets, sidewalks, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (June 28,
2018), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/2018/06/28/its-illegal-ride-bird-scooters-weredropped-off-downtown/741208002/.
203 See Wisconsin Public Radio, Milwaukee Dockless Scooters Case To Be Heard In Federal Court
(July 13, 2018), https://www.wpr.org/milwaukee-dockless-scooters-case-be-heard-federal-court.
204 See Wisconsin Public Radio, Bird Electric Scooter Company Voluntarily Pulling Out Of
Milwaukee(Aug. 6, 2018), hhttps://www.wpr.org/bird-electric-scooter-company-voluntarily-pullingout-milwaukee.
205 2019 Wis. Act 11 (codified at Wis. Stat. § 349.237).
206 See Keith Schubert, Milwaukee learning from other cities' woes while rolling out e-scooters,
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (July 22, 2019),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/milwaukee/2019/07/22/milwaukee-looks-learn-other-citiese-scooter-introduction/1754546001/
200
201
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rental electric scooters in the absence of state legislation granting them legal status
on state thoroughfares. 207 The necessary law did not pass until 2021. 208
In other states with vehicle codes no less forbidding, cities yielded to company
persuasion and consumer demand and allowed the introduction of rental scooters
anyway. 209 The Atlanta, Georgia, city council adopted an ordinance in 2019
providing for the operation of “shareable dockless mobility devices” in the city. 210
The category is defined as including “e-scooters” (although not “e-bicycles”). 211 No
state legislation recognizes such devices. Under Georgia law they remain “motor
vehicles.” 212 An amendment that would have added “electric scooters” to a list of
exclusions from the “motor vehicle” category, alongside “electric bicycles” and
“electric personal assistive mobility devices,” while subjecting them to local
government regulation, passed the Georgia Senate in February 2020, only to fail of
enactment in the Georgia Assembly. 213 Chicago has an electric scooter share
program. 214 Yet, unlike EPAMDs and electric bicycles, powered scooters remain
unregistered “motor vehicles” under Illinois law. 215 Numerous cities in Ohio
including Cincinnati, 216 Cleveland217 and the capital, Columbus, 218 allowed scooter
207 See Andrew Gomes, Rental scooter company Lime suspends service in Honolulu, Star Advertiser
(May 18, 2018), https://www.staradvertiser.com/2018/05/18/breaking-news/rental-scooter-companydefies-mayor-keeps-operating/.
208 See 2021 Hi. Act. 174.
209 While doctrines of “home rule” give localities substantial autonomy in some states, even where
they are quite strong, municipal traffic ordinances that conflict with state law have been struck
down. See, e.g., Webb v. City of Black Hawk, 2013 CO 9, 295 P.3d 480; Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29,
116 P.3d 290.
210 Atlanta, Georgia, Code of Ordinances Article X.
211 Id. § 150-400.
212 Georgia’s code contains the standard broad definition. Ga. Code § 40-1-1(33).
213 Georgia Senate Bill 159, 2020,
https://www.legis.ga.gov/api/legislation/document/20192020/189446. See David Wickert, Georgia
Senate Passes Electric Scooter Legislation, government technology (2/5/2020),
https://www.govtech.com/transportation/georgia-senate-passes-electric-scooter-legislation.html.
214 See Scooter Sharing in Chicago, Chicago,
https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/cdot/supp_info/escooter-share-pilot-project.html (last visited
June 17, 2022).
215 See 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/1-146; People v. Frazier, 2016 IL App (1st) 140911, 62 N.E.3d 1081
(holding that a powered scooter is a "motor vehicle" under Illinois law). A bill seeking to remove
them from that category was introduced in the Illinois Senate in October 2021. See Ill. Sen. Bill 2930
(2021).
216 See Cincinnati, Ohio, Code of Ordinances §§ 501-1-E3, 506-4; City issues interim guidelines for
electric scooter companies and riders, WCPO (Aug. 8, 2018),
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rental companies to put electric scooters on their streets during 2018, 2019, and
2020. Yet it was not until April of 2021 that an act of the state legislature
authorizing use of “low speed micromobility devices” on Ohio roadways took
effect. 219 Before that change, no matter what an Ohio city’s ordinances provided,
electric scooters met the state definition of “motor vehicle” and did not belong on its
streets or sidewalks. 220 Brookline, Massachusetts, authorized a shared electric
scooter program in 2019 in the face of unchanged state law. 221
While share operations brought this new type of mobility device to the attention of
city and state law makers, the scooters, in a range of configurations, had for some
years been available for individual purchase, long-term rental, and short-term
rental from fixed facility shops focused on recreational use and the tourist market.
The pandemic and rising gasoline prices have only increased the demand.
Comprehensive legislation at state and local levels must, as a consequence, address

https://www.wcpo.com/news/local-news/hamilton-county/cincinnati/city-issues-interim-guidelines-forelectric-scooter-companies-and-riders
217 See Cleveland, Ohio, Code of Ordinances, Chapt. 517; Robert Higgs, Cleveland to allow electric
scooter rentals this summer, targeting key parts of the city for pilot program (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://www.cleveland.com/cityhall/2019/06/cleveland-to-allow-electric-scooter-rentals-this-summertargeting-key-in-parts-of-the-city-for-pilot-program.html.
218 See Columbus, Ohio, §§ 2101.116, 2101.186, 2101.59; Rick Rouan, Columbus sets rules for
motorized scooters, The Columbus Dispatch (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.dispatch.com/news/20180828/columbus-sets-rules-for-motorized-scooters; Emily
Bamforth, Bird electric scooters now in Columbus: What are they, are they legal and could they come
to Cleveland? (July 13, 2018),
https://www.cleveland.com/entertainment/2018/07/bird_electric_scooters_now_in.html.
219 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4501.01, 4511.514 (added by 2019 Ohio HB 295). Despite the “home rule”
authority of Ohio’s municipalities, prior to passage of that law, local ordinances or agreements
authorizing use of electric scooters on a city’s streets would almost certainly have been struck down.
See generally Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270.
220 See City of Lakewood v. El-Hayek, 142 Ohio Misc. 2d 129 (Lakewood Mun. Ct. Dec. 29, 2006).
221 See Brookline, Mass., Shared Electric Scooter Pilot Program,
https://www.brooklinema.gov/1573/E-Scooter-Share-Pilot-Program; Kellen Browning, ‘A wild ride’:
Brookline grapples with high demand, headaches as electric scooter pilot zips along, Boston Globe
(July 26, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/07/26/wild-ride-brookline-grapples-withhigh-demand-headaches-electric-scooter-pilot-zips-along/QWJMclyrpCjf2xrxLifwlK/story.html.
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individual rider use as well as the terms on which public spaces (sidewalks and
roadways) may be used by enterprises offering them for on demand rental. 222
3. The Threshold Challenge: Defining the Category
Pressed by constituents, share-system lobbyists, and municipalities to sort out the
legal status of electric scooters, legislatures have lacked federal regulatory
guidance. The typical scooter wheel configuration, front and back rather than “nontandem,” disqualified them as “electric personal assistive mobility devices.” The
course the Federal Highway Traffic Safety Administration had taken after Congress
stripped it of jurisdiction over electric bicycles pointed toward the Consumer
Product Safety Commission as the pertinent federal agency. But whatever these
new devices were, their lack of operable pedals prevented them from qualifying as
electric bicycles, subject to and in compliance with CPSC standards which state
legislation could incorporate by reference.
State EPAMD and electric bicycle statutes did, however, suggest a successful
strategy. Adapting their approach to this new category of mobility device required,
first, a definition – one that could be added to the list of exceptions to the broad
definition of “motor vehicle,” thereby, shielding electric scooters, like EPAMDs and
qualifying electric bicycles from registration, equipment, license, insurance and any
other “motor vehicle” requirements that lawmakers judged inappropriate. A
definition was also needed to provide the scope for equipment and operating
regulations suited to the characteristics of the new category.
Clarity was essential. The common name for the devices, “scooter,” permitted easy
confusion for it had long been used to identify vehicles in the style of the Italian
Vespa, which state vehicle laws commonly include within the moped class of the
motorcycle category. Some ride-on devices used by individuals with mobility
impairments are also commonly referred to as “scooters.” Typically state codes
treat those as the equivalent of electric wheelchairs. The vehicles in question were
neither. Nor were they the subject of a model statute. One potential concern in
framing any definition was that it might include mobility devices raising
significantly different issues. Already on the road in California (legally under its

A recent amendment of the Alabama Code fails on this score. It adds “scooters and hoverboards”
to the state’s Motor Vehicle and Traffic Laws, but only when they are part of a “shared micromobility
device system.” See Ala. Code §§ 32-1-1.1(65) & (66), 32-19-2.
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vehicle code) 223 were electrically powered skateboards, controlled by hand-held
remote. Should these be lumped together with electric scooters or, following
California’s approach, should electric scooters be defined in terms that excluded
skateboards? 224 Most states limited their new electric scooter category to devices
that had two (or at most three) wheels and handlebars. 225 Having four wheels with
no handlebar, electric skateboards did not qualify, nor did electrically powered
unicycles which appeared on the market and California roads and sidewalks as
early as 2011. 226 In 2015, the California legislature gathered those together with
electric skateboards under a separate “electrically motorized board” definition, with
accompanying regulatory provisions. 227
The first electric scooters offered by shared-system companies had no seat, but the
market evolved. Later entrants, sensing an important niche, introduced scooters
designed to allow the rider to sit. For them, definitions that required a “platform
designed to be stood upon when riding” posed a potential challenge. This led some
states (and localities) to make it clear that while a platform was required, the
presence of a seat did not exclude a device from the new electric scooter category 228
or even that a device designed solely for a seated rider could qualify. 229 Were
scooters with the capacity to carry both operator and a passenger to be included or
should the definition limit scooters to single-rider devices? There were also
questions of speed and size – maximum weight, length, and width. Should the
definition include a top speed below the 20 mph cap set by the FHTSA and, if so,
measured how? Should lights be required? Turn signals? Brakes? Of what
capability? There was no national consensus on any of these points, and the
representatives of the major share-system companies were satisfied so long as their
inventory was covered. As new entrants in the rental or retail sales market sought

See Cal. Veh. Code §§ 313.5, 21290 – 21296.
Compare Cal. Veh. Code § 313.5 with Cal. Veh. Code § 407.5.
225 See, e.g., Ariz. Code § 27-51-1902; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-1; Ind. Code § 49.4; Kan. Rev. Stat. § 8126.
226 See Electric Unicycle, Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric_unicycle#Commercialisation.
227 See Cal. Veh. Code § 313.5.
228 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 316.003(44).
229 See, e.g., Hi. Rev. Stat. §§ 249-1, 291-C-1; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 482.0295.
223
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competitive advantage with different features – a seat or a third wheel – their
vehicles often failed to fit comfortably within early statutory definitions. 230
4. State Equipment and Operational Capability Requirements
The Consumer Product Safety Commission regulations for bicycles and qualifying
electric bicycles impose an important set of safety standards. They require brakes
shown by testing to be capable of bringing the device and a 170 pound rider to a full
stop in fifteen feet, 231 reflectors of specified placement, color, and capability, 232 and
key components that can withstand defined levels of force or stress. 233 Anyone
selling, distributing, or importing bicycles that fail to comply with those standards
violates federal law and is potentially subject to civil and criminal penalties. 234 For
motorcycles, including mopeds and motor-driven cycles, detailed equipment safety
standards are set by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA). 235 No comparable federal product safety standards exist for electric
scooters, however defined. 236 (Although the CPSC has not issued standards, the
hazards posed by the lithium ion batteries, in general, and electrical systems
powering and controlling mobility devices have received the agency’s attention and
led to some recalls, 237 cautionary guidance to consumers, 238 and participation in the
development of voluntary industry standards.) 239

230 See, e.g., Andrew J. Hawkins, Spin is testing remote-controlled electric scooters to prevent blocked
sidewalks, The Verge, Jan. 27, 2021, https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/27/22252156/spin-scooterremote-control-tortoise-segway (three wheels).
231 See 16 C.F.R. § 1512.5(b)(1).
232 See 16 C.F.R. § 1512.16.
233 See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1512.11-1512.14
234 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2068(a)(1), 2069, 2070.
235 See, e.g., 49 CFR § 571.122a (motorcycle breaking systems); 49 CFR § 571.123 (motorcycle
controls and displays). Like the federal bicycle standards these focus on the point of manufacture,
sale, or import and are backed by civil penalties. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30112, 30165.
236 This is not because of lack of statutory authority. The definition of “motor vehicle” that underlies
the National Traffic Safety Administration’s authority to set standards is amply broad: “a vehicle
driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads,
and highways.” 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(7). The American Society for Testing and Materials reports
work on a “voluntary” standard. See ASTM, New Specification for Commercial Electric-Powered
Scooters for Adults, https://www.astm.org/DATABASE.CART/WORKITEMS/WK70724.htm.
237 See, e.g., CPSC, Smart Balance Wheel Self-Balancing Scooters/Hoverboards Recalled by Salvage
World Due to Explosion and Fire Hazards (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.cpsc.gov/Recalls/2018/SmartBalance-Wheel-SelfBalancing-ScootersHoverboards-Recalled-by-Salvage-World-Due-to-Explosionand-Fire-Hazards; CPSC, Pacific Cycle Recalls Schwinn Electric Scooters Due to Fall and Injury
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It has, therefore, fallen to the states or their local governments, to impose any
requirements focused on braking ability, visibility, stability, the durability of
structural elements, or safety of the electrical components. To date, most state
electric scooter statutes have failed to address these issues. 240 Along with safety
standards, NHTSA also prescribes the attachment of unique vehicle identification
to covered “motor vehicles.” 241 State motor vehicle titling and registration
requirements build on that system. 242 Nothing like it applies to either electric
bicycles or electric scooters, and few states have established an alternative. 243 A
handful have authorized local governments to impose registration requirements. 244
5. Relationship of the Regulations Governing Electric Scooters to Those that Apply to Electric
Bicycles
The industry’s model electric bicycle legislation seeks to achieve equivalence with
conventional bicycles on a state’s roadways and sidewalks (same “rights and
duties”). Arizona’s “electric standup scooter” statute follows that basic pattern. 245
Most of the other early scooter statutes do as well, but add further restrictions.
Commonly, these include operator age limits. Arkansas and Kentucky set a

Hazards (Dec. 13, 2021), https://www.cpsc.gov/Recalls/2022/Pacific-Cycle-Recalls-Schwinn-ElectricScooters-Due-to-Fall-and-Injury-Hazards.
238 CPSC, Serious Injury or Death Can Occur if Lithium-Ion Battery Cells Are Separated from
Battery Packs and Used to Power Devices (Jan. 8, 2021).
239 See CPSC, Batteries, https://www.cpsc.gov/Regulations-Laws--Standards/VoluntaryStandards/Topics/Batteries.
240 Exceptions include Texas where the category’s definition specifies a braking system “capable of
stopping the device under typical operating conditions.” Tex. Transp. Code § 551.351(A)(1)(ii). A
similar non-specific brake system requirements is imposed by Kentucky. See Ken. Rev. Stat. §
189.010(26)(D) (“a brake adequate enough to stop and park the device”). California specifies brakes
“that will enable the operator to make a braked wheel skid on dry, level, clean pavement. Cal. Veh.
Code § 21235(a). Ohio’s e-scooter legislation contains minimum light and reflector requirements for
scooters ridden “at night.” See Oh. Rev. Stat. §4511.514(B)(3).
241 See 49 C.F.R. § 565.2.
242 See U.V.C. § 3-104 (2000).
243 The Arkansas electric scooter statute requires that scooters carry a unique identification number.
See Ark. Code § 27-51-1903. Hawaii has established a system of state-wide electric scooter
registration. See Hi. Rev. Stat. § 249-35.
244 See Cal. Veh. Code § 21225 (motorized scooters). Curiously, Colorado allows local governments to
impose a registration requirement on electric bicycles (and bicycles) but not on electric scooters. See
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-111(1).
245 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-819; Ken. Rev. Stat. § 189.289.
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minimum age of sixteen; 246 Hawaii, fifteen; 247 Minnesota, twelve; 248 Utah, eight 249
California requires that operators have a driver’s license or learner’s permit. 250 A
few states impose a requirement that riders wear helmets. 251 Some impose speed
limits lower than the maximum speed of the device. 252
Common are limits on where electric scooters may be ridden. A few state statutes
prohibit their operation on sidewalks, at least in the absence of a local ordinance to
the contrary. 253 Many do not. The majority simply impose the same rules of the
road on electric scooters that they apply to bicycles (and electric bicycles). In a
majority of states this permits operation on sidewalks unless a local ordinance
provides otherwise. 254 It also amounts to a requirement that when in the roadway,
scooters be ridden in a bicycle lane where one is available and otherwise along the
side. California directs riders making a left turn from that position to stop,
dismount, and cross as a pedestrian. 255 Most states allow electric scooters to turn
left following the same pattern as bicycles and other vehicles. 256 Some exclude
scooters from particular categories of roads, defined by speed limit, the lack of a
bicycle lane, or limited access. 257 Many authorize local governments to adjust some
of these parameters. Commonly, permission to ride scooters on bicycle and multiuse paths rests upon decisions by the public bodies or agencies with jurisdiction. 258

See Ark. Code § 27-51-1903.
See Hi. Rev. Stat. § 249.
248 See Minn. Stat. § 169.225.
249 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-1115(2).
250 See Cal. Veh. Code. § 21235(d).
251 Prior to a 2018 amendment California required that all riders wear helmets. See Cal. Assem. Bill
No. 2989, 2018. Its statute now imposes that requirement only on individuals under the age of 18.
See Cal. Veh. Code § 21235(c).
252 See Ark. Code § 27-51-1903 (15 mph).
253 See Minn. Stat. § 169.225; N.Y. Veh. L. § 1282(7); Or. Rev. Stat. § 814.524.
254 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. §§316.2065(9)-(10); 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. §11-1512; Wash. Rev. Code
§§46.61.755, 46.61.261. In some states a blanket ban on operating vehicles on sidewalks appears to
relegate bicycles and all devices governed by the same rules of the road to the roadway. See, e.g.,
Ga. Code Ann. §§40-6-144; Md. Code Ann., Transp. §21-1103; N.D. Cent. Code §§ 39-10-52.1, 39-0701.
255 See Cal. Veh. Code § 21229.
256 See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-1205(a)(1).
257 See Cal. Veh. Code § 21235(b).
258 See, e.g., Cal. Veh. Code § 21230; Ind. Code § 13.6; La. Rev. Stat. § 32:300.1.1.
246
247
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6 Relationship of Regulations Governing Electric Scooter and Electric Bicycle Use to Those that
Apply to Mopeds and Vespa-style Scooters
Under New York law, a two-wheeled powered vehicle with a seat, capable of no
more than 20 mph can, potentially, be treated as a “limited use motorcycle,” a
“bicycle with electric assist,” or an “electric scooter.” The category into which it is
placed carries major consequences. Neither overall size and weight nor wheel
diameter are factors. To be categorized by New York as a motorcycle, a device must
be certified by the manufacturer as meeting NHTSA standards. As a motorcycle,
albeit one with limited speed, the vehicle must be registered and display plates. Its
rider must hold a license. With greater speed (and in other states, even at this
speed) 259 insurance is required. In New York, so long as the vehicle is a “limited use
motorcycle” capped at 20 mph, it is not. 260 However, all of New York’s general
“motor vehicle” laws including its DUI and driving while texting statutes apply. 261
If the vehicle has operable pedals, it can qualify as a bicycle with electric assist so
long as it meets the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s standard. If it fits this
category, no license or registration is required, although a rider must be at least
sixteen. 262 As a bicycle with electric assist, its operation is subject to a more
restrictive set of rules of the road. 263 With or without pedals, a device can qualify as
an electric scooter. If it does, no license or registration is required, although the
rider must be at least sixteen. 264 No Consumer Product Safety Commission
requirements apply.
7. The Applicability of DUI, Reckless Driving, Phoning-while-Driving, Leaving-the Scene of a Crash
Statutes to Electric Bicycles, Electric Scooters (and EPAMDs)
Important state prohibitions, some induced by federal funding incentives, apply to
“motor vehicles” but, typically, not to bicycles. These include DUI statutes and
more recent laws focused on distracted driving (driving while phoning, texting, or
operating any handheld electronic device). DUI statutes typically make it unlawful

259 See Genuine Scooter Co., SCOOTER AND MOTORCYCLE LAWS BY STATE,
http://www.genuinescooters.com/scooter-state-laws.html.
260 See N.Y. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, Register a Moped, https://dmv.ny.gov/registration/registermoped.
261 See N.Y. Veh. & Traf. L. §§ 1176, 1225-c, 1225-d.
262 See N.Y. Veh. & Traf. L. § 1242(2).
263 See N.Y. Veh. & Traf. L. §§ 1242 –1243.
264 See N.Y. Veh. & Traf. L. §§ 1280 –1289.
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to “operate a motor vehicle” 265 or more expansively to “operate or be in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle” 266 while intoxicated. Provisions prohibiting
reckless driving or requiring drivers involved in an accident to remain at the scene,
often take the same form. 267 New York’s prohibitions on driving while using a
handheld phone, texting, or having both ears covered with earphones connected to
an audio device, are, similarly, limited to those “operating a motor vehicle.” 268
Removal of electric bicycles, electric scooters, and other micromobility devices from
the statutory definition of “motor vehicle” places them outside such provisions. 269
In states where prohibitions like these are framed in terms of all “vehicles” and
micromobility devices are removed only from the “motor vehicle” category but not
that more comprehensive one, this result need not follow. 270 Provisions that turn
around and explicitly subject individuals employing mobility devices to “all the
provisions applicable to the driver of a vehicle” have been interpreted in some states
as subjecting them to all laws that are not explicitly limited to “motor vehicles.” 271
8. Share Systems, Local Regulation versus Uniform State-Wide Rules
When the ride-share companies, Uber and Lyft, muscled onto the nation’s urban
scene, their dependence on state-licensed and regulated automobiles and the
insurance issues they posed led many, if not most, states to respond with legislation
that removed nearly all regulatory authority over the activity from municipalities.
The Texas law on ride-share operations leaves no space for additional local
oversight or control. 272 New York’s grants more populous communities the option of

See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-227a; Iowa Code § 321J.2.
See, e.g., Ariz. Code § 5-65-103; Ken. Rev. Stat. § 189A.010.
267 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-224(a); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 90, §§ 24(2)(a), 24(2)(a½)
268 See N.Y. Veh. & Tr. L. §§ 1225-c, 1225-d, 375(24-a).
269 See, e.g., State v. Greenman, 825 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Brown, 801 N.W.2d
186 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011). The federal statute requiring states to adopt and enforce an “open
container” laws contains the classic sweeping definition of “motor vehicle,” presumably reaching all
electrically powered micromobility devices, without regard to their classification under state law.
See 23 U.S.C. § 154.
270 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. §§ 316.003(46), 316.003(106), 316.193, 316.027. Cf. State v. Greene, 283 Ore.
App. 120, 388 P.3d 1132 (2016); People v Rogers, 438 Mich. 602, 475 N.W.2d 717 (1991).
271 See Velasquez v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. App. 4th 1471, 1473, 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 541, 542 (2014).
272 See Tex. Occ. Code § 2402.003.
265
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banning ride-share operations altogether, but does not permit them to layer
requirements on top of those imposed by the state. 273
By contrast, state statutes addressing bicycle, electric bicycle, and electric scooter
share operations have, in general, left local governments in full control. Beyond the
basic parameters set by state law for the type of vehicle (who can ride,
characteristics of the devices, where, in general terms, they may be ridden), core
questions are left to cities, villages, towns, and, in some cases, counties. In nearly
all states local governments have the authority to add restrictions to those imposed
by state law on these devices (sometimes with specified exceptions). 274 New York’s
statute authorizes local governments to be more permissive as well. It allows them
to permit operation of electric bicycles and electric scooters on roadways with speed
limits in excess of 30 mph and on sidewalks (from which they would otherwise be
barred). 275
D. Next Up: Micro Delivery Devices
In early 2019 delivery robots debuted at a U.S. university. Traveling along campus
sidewalks at around 4 mph without an operator onboard these vehicles brought
pizzas, salads, and sodas to hungry students. 276 As separate enclaves with their
own regulatory regimes, universities provided an attractive test environment. Over
the next two years, autonomous delivery devices weighing less than 100 pounds
when fully loaded spread to at least twelve other campuses. 277 In December 2019,
California’s Department of Motor Vehicles approved their use, as well as the use of
larger and faster autonomous delivery vehicles, along public roadways. 278 By
February 2022, legislation in 19 states and the District of Columbia permitted
273 See N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 182. See generally Joseph T. Theall, NOTE: Dear Ms. Councilwoman,
"What Can You Do About Uber in the City?": The Role of Local Governments in the Post-Regulatory
Landscape of Transportation Network Companies, 54 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 251 (2018); National
League of Cities, City Rights in an Era of Preemption: A State-by-State Analysis (2018),
https://www.nlc.org/resource/city-rights-in-an-era-of-preemption-a-state-by-state-analysis/.
274 See, e.g., Kan. Rev. Stat. § 8-113(c); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484A.469.
275 See N.Y. Veh. & Tr. L. § 1282.
276 See Mary Lee Clark, There are robots on campus—here’s what you need to know (Jan. 22, 20190,
George Mason University, https://www.gmu.edu/news/2019-01/there-are-robots-campus-heres-whatyou-need-know.
277 See Starship Enterprises, FAQ, https://www.starship.xyz/contact/faq/.
278 See California Authorizes Light-Duty Autonomous Delivery Vehicles (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/news-and-media/california-authorizes-light-duty-autonomousdelivery-vehicles/.
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“personal delivery devices” to travel along sidewalks on roughly the same terms as
pedestrians. The larger vehicles approved by California for roadway use do not
qualify, but the maximum weight of the devices permitted under recent state
statutes range up to 550 pounds unloaded. 279 Width, length, and height are not
specified. Typically, “personal delivery devices” are allowed to move at up to 10
mph on sidewalks and in other pedestrian spaces, 280 up to 20 mph where they are
allowed on public roadways. 281
Although the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has been involved in
the regulation of autonomous vehicles designed for highway use, it has neither
monitored nor regulated the development of these special-purpose vehicles designed
for low speed operation as robotic load-carrying pedestrians. The Consumer
Product Safety Commission, to which NHTSA has deferred on regulation of electric
scooters and similar forms of personal mobility, has little ground to assert
regulatory authority over a device that is neither bought nor rented by a consumer
but instead deployed by commercial entities to make deliveries. To date, the states
have been totally on their own in setting safety standards for these devices and
regulations, if any, aimed at minimizing the risk to those who must share public
rights-of-way, whether roadways, sidewalks or bike lanes, with them. Some have
passed that responsibility on to their municipalities. 282
E. The Status of Other Electrically Powered Personal Mobility Devices
Currently navigating the roadways and sidewalks of many U.S. cities are a variety
of battery-powered personal mobility devices that do not belong there according to
the provisions of the state’s vehicle and traffic code. In some states, still, these
include electric scooters; in a few, electric bicycles. In states that allow electric
bicycles and electric scooters on public roadways, devices of those general types that
fail to meet the relevant statutory definitions – whether due to their maximum
speed, 283 number of wheels (too few or too many), lack of handlebars, or some other
feature – also fall in this category. In nearly all states that is true of electrically

See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-38.5-302(15)(d).
See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-175.16(b)(2).
281 See, e.g., Utah Code § 41-6a-1119(2)(a)(ii).
282 See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-175.17; Utah Code § 41-6a-1119(8)(a).
283 Growing numbers of electric bicycles and electric scooters of great power and speed that have
escaped NHTSA regulation by being marketed for “off road” use can be spotted moving along public
roadways of all kinds.
279
280

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4037752

43
powered skateboards and single-wheeled devices, with or without gyro stabilization.
There are exceptions. Both are encompassed by California’s “electrically motorized
board” 284 and Michigan’s “electric skateboard” 285 categories. Arizona and Virginia
also authorize use of motorized skateboards on public ways. The Arizona statute
requires at least two wheels, thereby excluding single-wheeled devices. 286 Virginia’s
definition, which combines electric skateboards and scooters, does not. 287

IV. Inevitable Consequences of Lawmakers’ Failing to Address Widespread Use of Devices
that Are not “Street Legal”
A. Confusion, Inconsistent, Discriminatory, and, Very Likely, Pretextual Enforcement
The demand for personal powered mobility devices has moved far more rapidly than
federal and state lawmakers or public understanding. In growing numbers, small
electrically powered vehicles that fall under a jurisdiction’s “motor vehicle”
definition, but are neither registered nor eligible for registration, are being ridden
on public roadways and sidewalks of every state and major municipality. To many
members of the general public, including some riders of those devices, and to many
law enforcement personnel, the non “street legal” vehicles appear indistinguishable
from recently legalized electric bicycles and electric scooters.
Under the typical vehicle and traffic code, driving an unregistered vehicle on a
public roadway is a punishable offense. 288 The same is true of operating any motor
vehicle on a sidewalk. 289 For the rider of an unsanctioned device, fines and
impoundment, even arrest and search, are potential threats. 290 Since other laws

Cal. Veh. Code § 313.5
Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.13f.
286 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 28-101(50((b)(ii). Arizona also allows municipalities to ban both e-scooters and
e-skateboards. Lumping the two together, Tucson has done so. See Tucson, Ariz., Code of
Ordinances § 20-30.
287 Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-100.
288 See Commonwealth v. Eliason, 353 Pa. Super. 321, 509 A.2d 1296 (1986).
289 See, e.g., Roldan v. Flores, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7428 (Oct. 5, 2016).
290 In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a claim that to arrest and jail an individual for
commission of a minor traffic violation (failure to wear a seat belt, punishable by a fine of not more
than $50) violated the "right to be free from unreasonable seizure" established by the Fourth
Amendment. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). And in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S.
164 (2008) the Court held that arresting an individual for a traffic violation (driving without a valid
license) committed in the presence of law enforcement (even when arrest was not supported by state
law) did not violate the Fourth Amendment nor did the subsequent search.
284
285
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are likely to command higher priority for state and local police, 291 enforcement is
almost certain to be inconsistent and uncertain. 292 There is a high risk that it will
be biased, even pretextual. The record of traffic law enforcement, in general, 293 and
police interactions with bicycle and electric bicycle riders, in particular, furnishes
ample grounds for concern on that score. 294
B. Spillover into the Tort System
1. Civil Actions Arising Out of Collisions
High stakes consequences are likely to follow in the event of injury or death. If the
operator of a device is riding, unlawfully, on a sidewalk and collides with a
pedestrian or unlawfully within a bike lane and collides with a cyclist, causing
harm to the other, the violation is likely to be treated as evidence of negligence.
The same will likely to be true when harm results from a shared-system vehicle’s
being parked in violation of state or local law. Should a collision occur on a roadway
and the operator of the electric scooter or electric skateboard be injured or killed,
any claim against the driver of the automobile, bus, or truck involved will be
compromised if the micromobility device was being operated unlawfully.

291 See David Giacopassi & David R. Forde, Broken Windows, Crumpled Fenders, and Crime, 28 J.
Crim. Just. 397, 403 (2000) ("From the perspective of many officers, enforcing traffic laws is not real
police work . . . .").
292 See generally Joseph A.Schafer & Stephen D.Mastrofski, Police Leniency in Traffic Enforcement
Encounters: Exploratory Findings from Observations and Interviews, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 226 (2005).
293 See Emma Pierson et al., A Large-scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the
United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV.736, 736 (2020).
294 See, e.g., L.A. sheriff’s deputies use minor stops to search bicyclists, with Latinos hit hardest (LA
Times, Nov. 4, 2021),
https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-county-sheriff-bike-stops-analysis/;ACLU of Michigan Settles
"Biking While Black" Case; Teens Finally Given Closure, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (May 30, 2006),
https://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/aclu-michigan-settles-%E2%80%9Cbiking-whileblack%E2%80%9D-case-teens-finally-given-closure (discussing a lawsuit based on a memo that
instructed officers to pull over black youths on bicycles); Michael Andersen, Communities of Color
Bear the Brunt of Sidewalk-Biking Enforcement, PEOPLE FOR BIKES (Oct. 21, 2014),
http://www.peopleforbikes.org/blog/entry/communities-of-color-bear-the-brunt-of-sidewalk-bikingenforcement; Kyle Swenson, Biking While Black is a Crime, MIAMI NEW TIMES, Oct. 31, 2013,
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2013-10-31/news/biking-while-black-fort-lauderdale/full/ (examining
selective enforcement of a bicycle registration law). See also Christopher Ketcham, Cops Cultivate
Bike-Lane Chaos, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Dec. 16, 2021, https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/nyoped-cops-bike-line-chaos-20211216-ldyq6xjtxnhqpjrv3446duyafq-story.html.
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According to the Restatement of Torts (3d) and courts in a majority of states, when
an injury is caused by conduct that violates a statute and is of the sort the statute
was passed to prevent that conduct is "negligent per se." 295 Under most
circumstances, in most jurisdictions, the violation does not compel a finding of
liability but merely establishes a breach of the relevant standard of care. 296 The
fact-finder (judge or jury) must still determine whether the violation was a cause of
the collision. 297 Whatever form the doctrine takes, a finding that the individual
operating or parking a micromobility device on a public way (roadway, sidewalk,
park path) was in violation of state or local law can work to the disadvantage of the
rider in one of two ways. If the injury has been suffered by another (pedestrian,
cyclist, operator of a “street legal” powered device of any sort) the finding of
negligence can lead directly to personal liability for large sums. If the rider is
injured, it can block or reduce the amount of recovery from the other party. 298
A recent appeal decided by the Alabama Supreme Court illustrates the point. The
issue arose from a motorist’s defense of contributory negligence to a claim for
damages caused by his collision with an electrically-powered wheelchair. The
plaintiff was struck from behind by the defendant’s automobile while operating his
six wheeled motorized chair (maximum speed – 5 mph). The crash occurred as the
plaintiff prepared to make a left turn into his apartment complex from a road that
had no sidewalk or crosswalk. The plaintiff, forced to this form of mobility because
of cerebral palsy, was on his way home from a church supper in mid-April between 8
and 9 p.m. According to the court:
[His] wheelchair was equipped with a seat belt, two six-beam
flashlights on the footrest, two flashing red bicycle lights on the back of
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 14; Barbara
Kritchevsky, What Does Law Have to Do with it? The Jury's Role in Cases Alleging Violations of
Law, Custom, and Standards, 71 ARK. L. REV. 45, 72 (2018); Nora Freeman Engstrom, The
Automobile's Tort Legacy, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 303, 322, 324 (2018).
296 See, e.g., Anderson v. State Dept. of Natural Resources, 693 N.W.2d 181, 189 (Minn. 2005).
297 See, e.g., Klanseck v. Anderson Sales & Service, Inc., 426 Mich. 78, 89-90, 393 N.W.2d 356, 361
(1986); Grove v. Port Auth., 655 Pa. 535, 553-54, 218 A.3d 877, 888-89 (2019).
298 Tort litigation arising out of traffic accidents generated a late twentieth century shift in many
states from “contributory negligence,” the liability approach in which a plaintiff’s negligence
precludes any recovery, to “comparative negligence,” in which recovery is reduced according to the
parties’ respective culpability. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, The Automobile's Tort Legacy 53 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 303 (2018); Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A
Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697 (1978).
295
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his arm rests, some red reflectors on the back of the wheelchair, and an
orange vest with reflective yellow tape that was draped over the
back 299
Had the plaintiff been riding a bicycle or using a manually propelled wheelchair his
suit would not have faced the obstacle posed by Alabama’s vehicle code. It defined
“motor vehicle” in the typical sweeping terms. Unlike the codes of a vast majority of
states, however, it did not (and still does not) exclude motorized wheelchairs and
their equivalents from that definition nor include those using one within its
definition of “pedestrian.” 300 (At the time, it also contained no electric bicycle or
electric scooter exception so that the plaintiff’s legal situation would have been no
different had the case involved one of them.) Then and now Alabama law requires
“motor vehicles” operated on its roadways to have “a rearview mirror, a horn,
brakes, [and] brake lights.” 301 The plaintiff’s chair lacked all four. Alabama also
requires that a reflective triangle of a specified size and shape be displayed by slowmoving vehicles. 302
Because the Alabama statute defined pedestrians as persons traveling “afoot,” the
appellate court, rejected the defendant’s argument, which had been accepted by the
trial court, that the plaintiff should be found contributorily negligent for his failure
to follow “pedestrian” rules of the road. (Alabama directs pedestrians to travel in
the left lane against traffic when they are on roads with no sidewalk or shoulder. 303
Had the plaintiff been in the left lane, the trial court reasoned, the collision could
not have occurred.)
The plaintiff sought to have the wheelchair considered an “electric personal
assistive mobility device” or EPAMD. So viewed the state’s “motor vehicle”
requirements would not apply, and the plaintiff’s actions would be consistent with
the associated operating rules. But the Alabama Code’s definition of the EPAMD

Pruitt v. Oliver, 331 So.3d 99, 102 (Ala. 2021).
Ala. Code § 32-1-1.1(15.1).
301 Pruitt v. Oliver, 331 So.3d 99, 113 (Ala. 2021).
302 Ala. Code § 32-5-246. Bicycles and other “devices moved by human power” are excluded from the
statutory definition of vehicle and consequently do not carry this requirement. Ala. Code § 32-11.1(87).
303 Ala. Code § 32-5A-215(c).
299
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category like those elsewhere effectively limited the category to Segways (and
hoverboards). 304
The Alabama Supreme Court considered itself compelled to conclude that the
plaintiff was injured while operating a “motor vehicle,” one that failed to meet state
requirements. Fortunately for the plaintiff, that conclusion did not translate
directly into a finding of contributory negligence. The question the court sent back
for a determination at trial was whether the lack of any or all of the required “motor
vehicle” safety features on the plaintiff’s wheelchair “proximately caused the
accident.” 305 Nonetheless, because the plaintiff’s device was not “street legal” his
liability claim faced a major obstacle that would not have been there had he been
operating an EPAMD or bicycle. (While most U.S. jurisdictions have replaced
Alabama’s contributory negligence approach in which a plaintiff’s negligence bars
recovery, with one providing for a partial reduction, 306 such comparative negligence
states also require a causal connection or finding. 307)
The Alabama vehicle and traffic code was, and still is, an outlier in its failure to
address the distinctive legal issues faced by users of electric wheelchairs and other
powered mobility assistance devices. 308 Arguably, its vehicle code violates the
Americans with Disabilities Act. However, the state’s categorical approach to
regulating the use of its roadways and sidewalks is utterly typical. The challenge of
applying existing traffic laws to the many new types of electrically-powered vehicles
in the context of a tort action is no different from that faced by the Alabama
Supreme Court in this case. Collisions and subsequent attempts to recover for
injuries or fatalities will force attention to the discrepancy between existing vehicle
categories and the devices now moving about the nation’s streets and sidewalks,
even if law enforcement and city officials ignore it.
Ala. Code § 32-1-1.1(15.1).
Pruitt v. Oliver, 331 So.3d 99, 110-111 (Ala. 2021).
306 See Ellen M. Bublick, Comparative Fault to the Limits, 56 VAND. L. REV. 977, 978 n. 4 (2003).
307 See, e.g., Klanseck v. Anderson Sales & Service, Inc., 426 Mich. 78, 86-89 (1986); Kubasinski v.
Johnson, 46 Mich. App. 287 (1973); Leizerman v. Kanous, 2009-Ohio-1469, 181 Ohio App. 3d 579,
910 N.E.2d 26.
308 Justice Mendheim’s decision presents a detailed survey of all fifty states. He concludes that the
vehicle codes of only seven other states both fail to contain specific provisions addressing wheelchair
use and define “pedestrian” in terms that exclude wheelchair users. By his count, the vast majority
of states include individuals in wheelchairs in their definitions of “pedestrian.” Others have
specially tailored provisions that apply to wheelchairs or exclude them from their definition of “motor
vehicle.” Pruitt v. Oliver, 331 So.3d 99, 110-11 (Ala. 2021).
304
305
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In 2018 the Alabama legislature added electrically powered scooters and “shared
micromobility devices” to the defined terms in its motor vehicle code, specifying the
terms of their use. 309 In 2021 it added electric bicycles, removing them from the
“motor vehicle” category. 310 But it has yet to address the legal status of powered
wheelchairs. Under Alabama law as interpreted by the state’s highest court they
remain subject to all the statutory requirements imposed on “motor vehicles.”
Worse yet, as “vehicles” they would appear to be banned from Alabama’s
sidewalks. 311
2. Reduced Likelihood of Municipal Liability for Street Defects or Failures to Warn
Irregularities in a public thoroughfare that pose little hazard to automobiles can
prove disastrous to those riding on vehicles with two or three wheels. A spectrum of
doctrines stand between injured non-automotive travelers and recovery from the
public bodies responsible for road design and maintenance. Actions by cyclists or
their survivors point toward a conclusion that many states will deny recovery on
facts likely to yield a favorable outcome for the driver of an automobile. 312 A 1998
decision by the Illinois Supreme Court distinguished between intended users of a
roadway (those driving automobiles) and permitted users (in the case it faced, a
cyclist). 313 Those who are injured after running into a pothole or an unmarked
repair site while riding a device that state law has not authorized for use on public
streets in general or streets of the particular type involved will confront a far
greater challenge. If, however, the device is part of a shared system that the
municipality has licensed to operate within its boundaries, without regard to its

309 See Alabama Act 2019–437, adding new definitions to Ala. Code § 32-1-1.1 and a new § 32–19–2
governing the operation of shared micromobility devices and systems. It contains no provision for
scooters not part of a shared system.
310 See Alabama Act 2021–134, adding “electric bicycle” to Ala. Code § 32-1-1.1’s roster of defined
terms and a new § 32–5A–267 setting out the rules for their lawful use.
311 See Alabama Code § 32-5A-52.
312 See generally Franklyn P. Salimbene, Seeking Peaceful Coexistence: Streetcars and Bicycles in the
New Urban Environment, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 365 (2017) (examining case law holding that
there is no public duty to maintain every street so that it is suitable for cyclists);
Emily Hammond, Note: Government Liability When Cyclists Hit the Road: Same Roads, Same
Rights, Different Rules, 35 GA. L. REV. 1051 (2001)
313 Boub v. Twp. of Wayne, 183 Ill. 2d 520, 522, 234 Ill. Dec. 195, 196, 702 N.E.2d 535, 536 (1998).
See also Latimer v. Chi. Park Dist., 323 Ill. App. 3d 466, 467, 752 N.E.2d 1161, 1162 (2001).
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status under state law, 314 the argument that the use was neither intended nor
permitted will be difficult to maintain.
C. Uninsured Liability
Whether operating an electrically-powered micromobility device of a type and in a
jurisdiction and place where the law allows it or under prohibited conditions, any
mishap resulting in injury to the rider or another will, in all likelihood, expose an
insurance gap. If the operator of the device is covered by an automobile insurance
policy, the scope of coverage will almost certainly not reach loss or liability arising
from the use of such smaller powered vehicles. States with “no fault” regimes
typically allow personal injury recovery by individuals covered by an automobile
policy who are struck by an automobile while they are traveling as pedestrians or
cyclists. 315 However, that coverage does not apply, while the covered individual is
using another “motor vehicle.” 316 Although there is no assurance that state motor
vehicle code definitions will be read into insurance legislation or policies, if the
mobility device falls in a category that has been removed from a state’s “motor
vehicle” definition and the operator is covered by an automobile policy, there is, at
least, some possibility of recovery under the same conditions as a cyclist or
pedestrian. 317 The liability coverage of the typical automobile policy would almost
certainly not extend to injuries caused by a covered individual while riding an
electric bicycle, electric scooter, or similar micromobility device, whether or not
“street legal.” 318
A bicycle rider or skate-boarder who causes harm to another may have liability
coverage under a homeowner’s or renter’s policy. Both types of insurance frequently
cover not only loss or damage to a residence and personal property but also provide
liability insurance for some, although not all, claims and lawsuits brought against
the insured seeking compensation for accidental bodily injury or damage to
property. The primary focus is on damage suffered on the insured premises, but

See supra pp. 22-23.
See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 742.520.
316 See Underwriters Ratings Board, New York Mandatory Personal Injury Protection, Form No. BA
12, Other Definitions (c), at 3 (2001).
317 Hawaii has made this inclusion explicit. See Hi. Rev. Stat. § 431:10C-304.
318 A common personal auto policy form refers throughout to “autos.” While it extends that term to
include pickups and vans, it explicitly excludes “Any vehicle … [w]hich has fewer than four wheels.”
See Insurance Services Office, Inc., Form No. PP 00 01 01 05, EXCLUSIONS, at 4 (2003).
314
315
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many such policies extend coverage to liability arising out of the insured’s personal
(as opposed to business or commercial) activities that take place elsewhere. The
availability of coverage of this sort for a micromobility device mishap is, needless to
say, contingent on: (1) the rider’s being covered by a homeowner’s or renter’s policy
and (2) the use of the device falling within the policy’s definition of covered personal
activities. In any event, the fact that the device fits within a broad definition of
“motor vehicle” is, once again, likely to pose a problem. Typically, policies of this
type exclude liability arising out of the use of a “motor vehicle.” 319 As to electric
bicycles or electric scooters that a state has removed from its vehicle code’s “motor
vehicle” category it would be possible to contend that the exclusion does not apply.
Depending on the policy’s exact language, however, the insurer could plausibly
contend that its use of the term “motor vehicle” in this context is broader than, and
independent of, the statutory definition of the same phrase. 320 A provision recently
added to the California motorized scooter statute requires that contracts for scooter
sales warn the buyer, in large type, that existing insurance policies “may not
provide coverage for accidents involving use of the scooter.” 321
Those injured or causing injury while riding a device rented from a shared-system
company are in no better position. Under the terms and conditions that the major
companies impose on their customers, renters assume all risks, agree to hold the
company harmless, and commit to binding arbitration of all disputes with the
company. 322

V. Securing Reasonable Levels of Compliance with Any Regulations in this Area
A. Achieving Compliance with Traffic Laws: A More General Problem
The public’s relationship with traffic laws is complex. Many individuals who are
otherwise law-observant take posted speed limits to be conservative suggestions,
and stop signs, prompts to slow down and proceed with caution, rather than strict
319 See Insurance Services Office, Inc., Form No. HO 00 03 05 11, EXCLUSIONS, at 17-18 (2010)
(2003).
320 See generally Insurance Information Institute, Spotlight on: e-scooters and insurance (Feb. 20,
2019), https://www.iii.org/article/spotlight-on-e-scooters-and-insurance.
321 Cal. Veh. Code § 407.5(c) (effective Jan. 1, 2022).
322 See Bird Rental Agreement, Waiver of Liability and Release (July 6, 2020),
https://www.bird.co/agreement/; Lime User Agreement, https://www.li.me/user-agreement (last
visited Feb. 14, 2022); Lyft Rideable Rental, Waiver of Liability and Release Addendum (Sept. 9,
2020), https://s3.amazonaws.com/api.lyft.com/static/terms-scooter-bike.html.
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commands. For most, the degree of compliance will be a function of the perceived
likelihood of enforcement and a personal assessment of the risk of collision or other
mishap. 323 And under many circumstances, the likelihood of enforcement is low.
Police officers do not, as a class, view enforcement of the traffic code as high priority
work. 324 As a consequence, their approach to it tends to be highly discretionary. 325
Traffic rule compliance is particularly problematic among travelers who – often
with good cause – view existing highway infrastructure, traffic laws, and control
systems as auto-centric to the point of disregarding their presence or legitimate
needs. Pedestrians and cyclists tend to fit in this class. 326 Those riding
micromobility devices appear to be joining them.
That is a problem. The risk of injury or death for both rider and others is
sufficiently large, and the micromobility phenomenon, sufficiently novel that an
appropriate legal response requires more than enactment of distinct traffic rules for
limited classes of these powered vehicles, in the expectation of high levels of public
familiarity and compliance encouraged by widespread and consistent police
enforcement. That approach will not only prove ineffectual but miss an opportunity
to test new methods of securing greater levels of traffic law compliance more
generally.
B. The Threshold Challenge: Keeping Non-Street-Legal Devices off the Streets
NHTSA’s attention to configuration, abandoned in 2008, 327 reflected a concern with
enforcement. The agency’s insistence that slow speed vehicles resembling
motorcycles comply with federal motorcycle equipment and VIN standards,
facilitated state registration and the issuance of license plates. In most states, the
323 See generally Claire Corbett & Frances Simon, Decisions to Break or Adhere to the Rules of the
Road, Viewed from the Rational Choice Perspective, 32 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 537 (1992)
324 See David Giacopassi & David R. Forde, Broken Windows, Crumpled Fenders, and Crime, 28 J.
CRIM. JUST. 397, 403 (2000) ("From the perspective of many officers, enforcing traffic laws is not real
police work . . . ."); P.A.J. WADDINGTON, POLICING CITIZENS: AUTHORITY AND RIGHTS 10 (1999)
325 See Joseph A. Schafer & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Police Leniency in Traffic Enforcement
Encounters: Exploratory Findings from Observations and Interviews, 33 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 226 (2005).
326 A. Tom & M. AxelleGranié, Gender Differences in Pedestrian Rule Compliance and Visual Search
at Signalized and Unsignalized Crossroads, 43 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 1794 (2011); W.E.
Marshall, D. Piatkowski & A. Johnson. Scofflaw Bicycling: Illegal but Rational, 10 J. OF TRANS. &
LAND USE 805 (2017); N. Chaloux1 & A. El-Geneidy, Rules of the Road: Compliance and Defiance
among the Different Types of Cyclists, TRANS. RESEARCH RECORD 1–10 (2019).
327 See p. 30 supra.
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absence of plates on any powered two-wheeled vehicle traveling along a public
highway was, by itself, presumptive evidence of a traffic violation.
No longer. The core characteristic distinguishing “street legal” electric scooters and
electric bicycles from those that cannot lawfully be operated on a public roadway is
maximum speed. The current electric bicycle and electric scooter market includes
many models that exceed the 20 mph boundary set by NHTSA’s 2008 tentative
interpretation and the upper limits set by state motor vehicle laws, some by a large
margin. 328 Advertised for “off road” use in order to avoid NHTSA standards, such
vehicles are hard to distinguish from “street legal” look-alikes except when they
unleash their full power. Past NHTSA rulings hold that bringing a vehicle’s top
speed down to 20 mph by means of a governor or other adjustable mechanism does
not avoid “motor vehicle” characterization. 329 A fair reading of state electric bicycle
and electric scooter legislation yields the same conclusion. Under this view, an
electric bicycle capable of speeds in excess of 20 mph that is held to that speed by
the rider’s selection of an “on road” setting falls within the federal “motor vehicle”
definition and outside the “street legal” classes of electric bicycles of the typical
state statute.
NHTSA could and should be more vigilant in scrutinizing electrically powered
bicycles, scooters, and unicycles that purport to be designed for off-road use.
Further, as a condition for permitting the manufacture or import of any higher
speed electric micromobility device, NHTSA might reasonably require the
attachment of a permanent, highly visible label, of specified format, identifying the
vehicle as “for off-road use only.” The agency has long treated “a warning label

For example, the ONYX RCR can be set to electric bicycle power and speeds but can also travel at
up to 60 mph. See Micah Toll, ONYX RCR First ride: Flying fast on this 60 mph electric moped,
electrek (March 5, 2020), https://electrek.co/2020/03/06/onyx-rcr-first-ride-60-mph-electric-moped/.
The Fiido Beast is an electric scooter that can travel at up to 30 mph. See Micah Toll, Fiido Beast
seated & standing 30 mph electric scooter launches, offers choose-your-own ride style, electrek
(March 23, 2022), https://electrek.co/2022/03/23/fiido-beast-seated-standing-30-mph-electric-scooterlaunches-offers-choose-your-own-ride-style/. The Segway Company has begun selling an electric
scooter capable of 43 mph. See Kate Kozuch, Segway's new scooters are alarmingly fast — and
there's a new electric skateboard, tom’s guide (March 03, 2022),
https://www.tomsguide.com/news/segways-new-scooters-are-alarmingly-fast-and-theres-a-newelectric-skateboard.
329 See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Department of Transportation, Two- and
Three-Wheeled Vehicles, 70 Fed. Reg. 34810 (June 15, 2005).
328
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stating that the vehicle is not intended for use on the public roads” to be a
significant factor bearing on whether it is subject to NHTSA standards. 330
In the absence of federal action, states could do the same. There are several
reasons, however, for states to focus instead on requiring micromobility devices, of
the types they do permit on public roadways, to display distinctive indicia.
C. Vehicle Registration with Assignment of a Unique ID
Historically, state registration, evidenced by license plates readable at a distance,
has signaled compliance with state motor vehicle requirements. It has also
furnished a means of assigning responsibility for traffic and parking infractions. If
small electrically powered vehicles are to become as significant a presence on the
nation’s streets and highways as they seem destined to be, at least in some regions,
they warrant administrative oversight comparable to that currently given
neighborhood electric vehicles and mopeds. Registration accompanied by
mandatory display of a unique identifier is the place to begin.
D. Use of Administrative Procedures and Personnel. Automated Systems, and Citizen Reports to
Hold Micromobility Users Accountable
In recent years, the ways in which police, state and local, enforce traffic laws have
come under increased scrutiny and criticism. 331 The dominant model of
micromobility legislation has simply added a large number of vehicles, divided into
multiple categories, each with a distinct set of regulations, onto existing police
traffic responsibilities. The introduction of micromobility devices might instead be
viewed as an opportunity to explore alternative enforcement methods. Many
communities have begun to rely on technology built into share-system devices and
monitoring systems to secure compliance with restrictions on where those devices
may be ridden, at what speed, and where they may be parked. 332 Although the

330 See Letter from Erika Z. Jones, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to John R. Niemela, President, Ranger
International, Inc., Sept. 25, 1987, https://www.nhtsa.gov/interpretations/nht87-35; NHTSA,
Importation and Certification FAQs, 03, https://www.nhtsa.gov/importing-vehicle/importation-andcertification-faqs-8#faq-31776.
331 See J. B. Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic Stops, 62 UCLA L. REV.
672 (2015).
332 See Division of Research, Innovation and System Information, Caltrans, Analyzing the Potential
of Geofencing for Electric Bicycles and Scooters in the Public Right of Way (Jan. 17, 2020),
https://dot.ca.gov/-/media/dot-media/programs/research-innovation-systeminformation/documents/preliminary-investigations/geofencing-for-electric-bicycles-and-scooters-pi-
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approach holds great promise, it fails to reach the operation of the rapidly growing
number of micromobility devices that are individually owned.
Automated systems capable of reading vehicle tags have, in some localities, become
an accepted tool of traffic law enforcement. 333 Properly deployed they could be used
to monitor the use of micromobility devices. Even more sophisticated options exist.
On many of the nation’s toll roads and bridges, vehicles are identified and charges
assessed through the use of RFID transponders and readers. Micromobility devices
offer an opportunity to expand the use of this technology.
A state-enforced requirement of registration tags legible at a distance to the human
eye or camera and recordable by an RFID reader could facilitate enforcement of
traffic rules against all “street legal” micromobility devices and provide useful data
on the performance of share-system operators. It might also enable municipal
jurisdictions that have already shifted parking law enforcement from police officers
to administrative personnel to do the same with this new category of street users 334
and to introduce automated enforcement to a less firmly entrenched set of vehicle
operators. Some might even enlist citizen volunteers. 335

a11y.pdf; Sonja Sharp, Cities Use Invisible Geofencing to Control Use of E-Scooters (Sept. 17, 2019),
government technology, https://www.govtech.com/transportation/cities-use-invisible-geofencing-tocontrol-use-of-e-scooters.html.
333 See Paul McNaughton, Comment, Photo Enforcement Programs: Are They Permissible under the
United States Constitution, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 463 (2010). See generally Kimberly Eccles,
Rebecca Fiedler, Bhagwant Persaud, Craig Lyon & Glenn Hansen, Automated Enforcement for
Speeding and Red Light Running, NCHRP Report 729,
https://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/speedmgt/ref_mats/fhwasa1304/resources2/27%20%20Automated%20Enforcement%20for%20Speeding%20and%20Red%20Light%20Running.pdf.
334 See Sarah A. Seo, (2020), A Path to Non-Police Enforcement of Traffic Violations,
https://www.filesforprogress.org/memos/non-police-enforcement-of-civil-traffic-violations.pdf
335 At present both roadways and sidewalks are contested space. Some members of the public view
non-compliance with the rules governing their use with a high level of personal grievance. This is
true of pedestrians inconvenienced or endangered by the unlawful operation or parking of a
micromobility device on a sidewalk. It is true, as well, of cyclists and micromobility users who
encounter automobiles or trucks stopped (with or without hazard lights on) in the bicycle lane
designated for their exclusive use. Models of traffic law enforcement have begun to appear that
enlist the upset citizen armed with a smart phone as agent. Some add the encouragement of a
financial payoff, by returning a fraction of any resulting fine to the individual reporting the offense.
See, e.g., Samuel Stark, Car Blocking a Bike Lane? You Might Be Able to Report it and Make Some Money
Soon, AUSTIN MONITOR (June 9, 2022), https://www.austinmonitor.com/stories/2022/06/car-blocking-a-bike-laneyou-might-be-able-to-report-it-and-make-some-money-soon/; New York City, Citizens Air Complaint Program,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/dep/environment/idling-citizens-air-complaint-program.page.
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VI. A Few Concluding Observations
The sale and rental of a growing variety of electrically powered personal mobility
devices is a major national phenomenon. Despite their differences, these vehicles
share characteristics that are attractive to users, and to public officials responsible
for metropolitan transportation planning. They do not burn fossil fuel. In terms of
energy use and space required, they are a far more efficient way to move individual
travelers over short distances than even the smallest automobile or neighborhood
electric vehicle. When parked, they require less space. Offered through shared
systems, they can be positioned to fill gaps between public transit and a traveler’s
starting point, destination, or both.
On the other hand, except for the intrepid, their usefulness is limited to fair
weather. The cold temperatures, snow, and ice experienced during winter in some
parts of the country render their use unpleasant and, in varying degrees, unsafe.
Extreme heat and heavy summer storms also curb their use. Lastly, because of the
physical demands and risks they place on the operator, electric bicycles, scooters,
skateboards, and unicycles are neither attractive nor suitable transportation
alternatives for a sizable portion of the population.
The safety risks these vehicles pose for the operator and other members of the
public sharing the same space warrant serious attention from the federal agencies
charged with setting standards for all vehicles destined for roadway use. Between
them, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and Consumer Product
Safety Commission have ample statutory authority to regulate the design,
construction, and identification of these new devices. 336 They, not the states
individually, need to address such fundamental questions as whether all
micromobility devices should be required to emit a warning sound, as even new
slow-speed electric vehicles with four wheels must now. 337 Issues of that sort call
for a national rather than a state-by-state answer. Although NHTSA backed away

See supra pp. 5-7.
See 49 C.F.R. § 571.141. This requirement is the product of the Pedestrian Safety Enhancement
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–373. While the statute’s mandate extended to the full range of motor
vehicles as defined by 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(6), the standard is limited to those with four-wheels.
NHTSA explained, in 2016, it didn’t nave “enough information … to apply the minimum acoustic
requirements of this final rule to [motorcycles].” 89 Fed. Reg. 90416, 90417 (Dec. 14, 2016). Six
years later, the regulatory question calls for a standard that would apply consistently to all electric
“motor vehicles,” broadly defined, that move materially faster than the average pedestrians.

336
337
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from vehicles of this sort during an era when its enthusiasm for standard-setting
was low and small, slow speed devices seemed a distraction, electrically powered
vehicles capable of speeds no greater than 20 mph have, over the last decade,
become “street legal” on many of the nation’s roadways. They are, as a result,
squarely within the U.S. Code’s “motor vehicle” definition upon which NHTSA’s
regulatory authority is grounded. Whether autonomous delivery robots operate on
roadway or sidewalk, they too properly fall within its purview and not that of the
CPSC. NHTSA’s parent, the Department of Transportation, has awakened to the
importance of “walking, biking, … [and] rolling” as modes of individual mobility. 338
Able to offer states funding for infrastructure changes and improvements, 339 it is in
an ideal position to guide and coordinate state micromobility regulation. 340
Like the public infrastructure designed to facilitate movement around and between
the nation’s cities, towns, and villages, the state laws governing that movement still
remain largely configured around automobiles and their larger relatives, on the one
hand, and pedestrians on the other, with limited accommodation of bicycles. Fitting
motorized delivery robots, skateboards, standup scooters, bicycles into this
framework has largely been accomplished by following the path of the nearly extinct
Segway 341 and creating arbitrarily defined exceptions to state motor vehicle
statutes, each with its own set of operating rules, while largely ignoring the
challenges of securing compliance.
Both equipment standards and regulation of use should apply with reasonable
consistency across device types, without distinctions based on features that have
little or no bearing on functional capability or safety while attending to those like
wheel size, stability, braking, electrical and control systems that do. In the absence
of the National Uniform Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, there
is a need for some other entity to take on the role that organization fulfilled during
the twentieth century – drafting model traffic and vehicle provisions that encourage
greater consistency across the country and sharing best practices among the fifty
338 See generally Department of Transportation, National Roadway Safety Strategy (Jan. 22, 2022),
https://www.transportation.gov/NRSS.
339 See U.S. DOT, Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, https://www.transportation.gov/bipartisaninfrastructure-law.
340 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30102(a)(7), 30111.
341 See NPR, After Nearly Two Bumpy Decades, The Original Segway Will Be Retired In July (June
23, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/23/882536320/after-nearly-two-bumpy-decades-the-originalsegway-will-be-retired-in-july.
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states. Plausible candidates include the Uniform Law Commission 342 and the
Governors Highway Safety Association. 343 Climate, degree of urbanization, quality
of existing infrastructure for bicycles and other forms of low-speed individual
vehicular mobility, along with other factors will inevitably lead to differences in how
states regulate the use of these devices. They argue powerfully, as well, for states
granting local governments substantial authority to add their own requirements.
To date, the established pattern of state automobile, motorcycle, and moped
legislation has largely been rejected for this twenty-first century wave of
individualized mobility. Yet the underlying public safety concerns that earlier
pattern addressed remain largely unanswered. These include the need for some
means of screening the individuals who are allowed to control the vehicles and for
facilitating the identification of sellers and buyers, owners and renters, who violate
the rules that govern their sale, rental, and use. The practice of licensing
automobile, motorcycle, and moped drivers provides an accepted means of assuring
that the operators of such vehicles have sufficient age, visual and physical capacity,
knowledge of the applicable rules, and operational skill to be entrusted with their
use in public space. It also furnishes a mechanism for taking hazardous operators
off the road. Registration of individual vehicles, reflected in a publicly displayed
tag, is a universally employed means of enabling law enforcement personnel to
distinguish “street legal” vehicles from those that are not and to identify the owners
accountable for their use. Concededly, those moving about on a vehicle propelled
solely by their own muscular power (whether bicycle, skates, or skateboard) are,
typically, neither screened nor tagged. It is far from obvious, though, that powered
devices, capable of speeds of 20 mph or more, most of which must be balanced,
should be allowed in shared public space without any operator vetting or a ready
means by which those violating the applicable rules of the road can readily be
identified. That becomes increasingly clear as nominally “off road” counterparts
with way too much power and speed to be “street legal,” but visually
indistinguishable from those that are, become available. Already the record is clear;
even “street legal” electric bicycles and electric scooters can pose a serious risk to
their riders and others. 344

See Uniform Law Commission, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview.
See GHSA, https://www.ghsa.org/.
344 See, e.g., U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Micromobility Products-Related Deaths
Injuries and Hazard Patterns 2017-2020 (2021), https://www.cpsc.gov/content/Micromobility342
343
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Every state has an agency with personnel, systems, and expertise focused on
screening and regulating the vehicles permitted to move along the jurisdiction’s
roadways and the individuals authorized to operate them. The indicia of
authorization they issue – vehicle tags and operators’ licenses – make it possible for
state and local law enforcement personnel to identify authorized devices and drivers
and distinguish them from those that don’t belong. Just as fresh technology has
made these new forms of mobility possible, technology offers ways to provide more
effective enforcement of the rules governing their use. If the laws governing
micromobility devices are to be widely understood, followed, and effectively
enforced, comparable institutional means must be found.
Major legislative and regulatory catch-up is needed. It will require focused and
ongoing attention at federal, state, and municipal levels.

Products-Related-Deaths-Injuries-and-Hazard-Patterns-2017-2020; Kevin Rix, Nora Demchur, David
Zane, & Lawrence Brown, 40 Am. J. of Emergency Medicine 166 (2021); Kevin Farley, Matthew
Aizpuru, Jacob Wilson et al., Estimated Incidence of Electric Scooter Injuries in the US From 2014 to
2019 (2020), JAMA Network Open, 2020;3(8):e2014500,
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2770043.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4037752

